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Foreword
It was changed in shape, certainly. Less 
generous in some areas, notably in 
housing. But in others – not just health and 
education but also social care and some 
benefits for the disabled – it had been 
undeniably bolstered, even if some of the 
mechanisms that accompanied the extra 
money, such as the introduction of more 
market-like mechanisms in the provision 
of services, remained controversial.
Right now, there is no doubt that what 
is happening is historic. The Coalition 
has announced the biggest single set of 
spending cuts since at least the Second 
World War - £81 billion of them. Many 
affect the welfare state – with even the 
relative protection offered to schools and 
health amounting, in reality, to a reduction 
in the face of rising demand.
The rise in tuition fees for higher 
education is a watershed – a partial de-
nationalisation of the universities. So too 
is the ending of child benefit as a universal 
payment.
Some technical sounding changes – the 
replacement of the retail price index by 
the consumer price index for uprating the 
state second pension and public service 
pensions will reduce their value by perhaps 
a quarter over the coming decades unless 
the formula is again changed.
The cuts to housing benefit have led to 
fears that the least well off will be forced 
out of city centres – changing the shape 
and nature of British society.
Some cherished parts of Labour’s 
programme to boost social mobility – 
the child trust fund and educational 
maintenance allowances, for example – 
are going. Against that, within the schools 
budget, there will be a ‘premium’ for 
disadvantaged pupils.
And then there are policies that accompany 
the Spending Review – for example the 
In the middle of history, it is hard to get it right. It can be done. Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary in 1914, 
declared that ‘the lamps are going out all 
over Europe’ - a phrase that presciently 
declared that the First World War would 
change western society forever.
Against that, Richard Titmuss, in his 
day the doyen of social policy scientists, 
once declared that an admittedly large 
increase in the amount of funding that 
went to the NHS from the more regressive 
national insurance contributions rather 
than general taxation, was ‘the final stick 
of dynamite under the welfare state’ - a 
judgement that few would share 50 years 
on.
Equally, many made the same judgement 
during Margaret Thatcher’s earlier 
years as prime minister – her 1980 
social security bill consisted of just six 
clauses, every one of which was a cut. 
Some of those were indeed game changing. 
They ended the UK’s tentative move 
towards a more mainland European-style 
earnings related benefit system. Some did 
profound damage – the abolition of the 
‘better of earnings or prices’ formula for 
uprating the basic state pension sent it on 
a slow downward spiral that undermined 
both state and private pensions for 30 
years. It has only now been halted by 
the Coalition Government placing a ‘triple 
lock’ on the increase, so that it will rise 
by the best of earnings, prices or £2.50 a 
year – a somewhat bold move, one might 
say, given the deficit.
On the benefits side, much of the welfare 
state got meaner in the 1980s and 1990s 
in the wake of two recessions. Yet by the 
early 1990s, in the memorable phrase of 
Julian Le Grand, despite the ‘economic 
hurricane’ and ‘ideological blizzard’ to 
which it had been subjected, what was 
remarkable was how much of the welfare 
state survived, not how little was left. 
Foreword
nicholas Timmins, The Financial Times, spa presidenT
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Foreword
The papers range from the fairly technical, 
to a call to the social policy community to 
lead a national campaign in defence of the 
welfare state, to the judgement that ‘this 
is how you break a society’.
Time and events will tell. But here, 
still close to the announcements, is an 
academic version of ‘the first rough draft 
of history’ – an attempt in the middle of 
it to assess just how profound the impact 
on welfare, and the welfare state, will be.
move to a single, universal credit – that 
are not particularly party political in origin 
but which have the potential for a big 
impact on their recipients.
In this collection – In Defence of Welfare – 
some of the UK Social Policy Association’s 
leading lights analyse these changes. 
And given that there were going to be 
cuts anyway to address the deficit, some 
suggest alternatives.
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The new poliTics oF welFare
Prices Index (RPI) or Rossi index (which is 
the same as the RPI except that it excludes 
the costs of mortgage interest payments, 
rent and council tax), as they are at the 
moment. Because the CPI has historically 
given a lower measure of inflation than 
either the RPI or the Rossi index, this is 
effectively an across-the-board cut to all 
benefits received by working-age adults 
(the pension credit guarantee and the 
Basic State Pension have been spared, 
since these will be increased in line with 
earnings rather than prices); the change 
is, therefore, estimated to save the 
Government £5.8 billion a year by 2014–
15, a figure that will increase each year as 
the savings compound. 
There are two main reasons for the 
differences between the RPI and CPI. Firstly, 
like the Rossi index, the CPI excludes the 
costs of mortgage interest and council tax 
(although, unlike Rossi, it includes rent), 
which have, in the past, tended to rise faster 
than general prices. Secondly, a technical 
difference in the way the CPI is calculated 
means that, even if it covered the same 
goods as the RPI, it would still give a lower 
measure of inflation. The Government 
argues that these differences make the 
CPI a better measure of the ‘inflation 
experience’ of households on benefits, 
on the grounds that benefit recipients 
are largely insulated from changes in the 
housing costs the CPI excludes, and that 
the way the CPI is calculated allows for 
the fact that households can minimise the 
impact of price changes on their welfare 
by substituting away from goods that have 
become relatively more expensive. The 
second of these arguments is reasonable, 
although the first has been questioned 
by other Institute for Fiscal Studies 
June 2010’s Emergency Budget and October 2010’s Spending Review were the Coalition Government’s 
opportunity to prove it was serious about 
cutting the deficit. Not cutting the deficit 
is not an option: the financial crisis and 
associated recession opened an additional 
structural hole of approximately 5.8 per 
cent of national income, or £86 billion per 
year in today’s terms. Ignoring this would 
lead to an unsustainable debt path. 
But, of course, no political party has ever 
proposed to do nothing about the deficit. 
There are choices to be made about how 
fast to do it, and whether the hole should 
be filled mostly with tax rises or spending 
cuts. The previous government suggested 
filling 70 per cent of this structural hole by 
2016/17, but the Coalition Government 
wants to go further faster, closing the 
hole entirely by 2014/15. In the general 
election campaign, the Conservative Party 
suggested that 80 per cent of the hole be 
filled by cutting spending, and 20 per cent 
by increasing taxes. At the time of the 
election, the other political parties wanted 
tax rises to do slightly more of the work 
and spending cuts slightly less, and, in the 
end, the plans announced in the Spending 
Review assume that 73 per cent of the 
work will ultimately be done by spending 
cuts and 27 per cent by tax rises. 
WELFARE CUTS
Of the £80 billion a year spending cuts 
announced in the Spending Review, £18 
billion will be found from cuts in welfare 
spending by 2014-15. The largest single 
saving came from the decision to link 
benefits and tax credits with the Consumer 
Prices Index (CPI) rather than the Retail 
cuTs To welFare spending
miKe Brewer and James Browne, insTiTuTe For Fiscal 
sTudies
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number of unusual features. First, the 
means test will be based on individual 
rather than joint income. This means that, 
to give an extreme example, a one-earner 
couple with an income of £44,000 would 
lose all their child benefit, but two-earner 
couple where each has an income of 
£43,000 would keep all their child benefit. 
Secondly, this reform seriously distorts 
incentives for some families with children. 
In particular, parents whose income is just 
below the higher-rate income tax threshold 
would find themselves considerably worse 
off after a small rise in income as they 
would effectively lose all their child benefit 
as soon as their income rose above the 
higher-rate income tax threshold. The 
Government argues that using the income 
tax system to means-test child benefit 
is less costly than devising a brand-new 
means-test, and can be implemented more 
quickly. But the Government could have 
straightforwardly reduced spending on 
child benefit by combining it with the child 
tax credit in some way. Furthermore, the 
Government expects to lose £280 million 
a year through parents potentially affected 
by the loss of child benefit manipulating 
their taxable income to avoid crossing the 
higher-rate threshold, which is hardly the 
sign of a cheap or efficient means-test (HM 
Treasury/DWP/HMRC, 2010). 
The reforms to tax credits mainly involve 
a more aggressive means-test, with the 
rate at which tax credits are withdrawn 
being increased from 39 per cent to 41 
per cent from April 2011 and tapering the 
family element of CTC immediately after 
the child element is exhausted. This will 
mean that, from April 2012, a two child 
family will not receive any tax credits if 
their income exceeds £31,000. Significant 
sums will also be saved by altering the way 
in which tax credits respond to changes 
in circumstances (essentially, allowing 
parents less time to back-date claims, 
having tax credits respond more quickly to 
rises in income, and more slowly to falls 
in income); it is likely that the number 
of overpayments will rise as a result. 
However, the Government has announced 
above-inflation increases in the per-child 
element of the child tax credit in 2011 
and 2012, at a total cost of £2.4 billion. 
The combined impact of all these changes 
on tax credit entitlement is complicated, 
depending on how many children are in the 
researchers (Browne and Levell, 2010a). 
There are two main criticisms of the 
Government’s argument. First, households 
that are already insulated from housing 
costs because they receive housing benefit 
and council tax benefit currently have their 
benefits uprated with the Rossi index, 
which already excludes these items; for 
these households, the CPI therefore offers 
little, if any, improvement in terms of its 
coverage. (However, once local housing 
allowance rates are increased in line with 
the CPI rather than local rents from 2013–
14, the CPI will provide a better coverage 
for these households, since they will then 
be exposed to real increases in rents). 
Second, for households who do not receive 
means-tested benefits, the coverage of 
the CPI is less appropriate than the RPI 
for measuring their inflation experience 
because such households do tend to face 
the costs of housing and council tax. 
The other benefits that will be hit with 
significant cuts are child benefit, the 
child and working tax credits (CTC/WTC), 
housing benefit – particularly housing 
benefit paid to those renting in the private 
sector, known as Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA), Disability Living Allowance (DLA) 
and Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA). Most of these are benefits that have 
seen expenditure rise in real terms over the 
past 10 or 15 years. But there is no simple 
reason for these increases: spending 
on housing benefit did rise considerably 
during the recent recession, as one would 
expect, but both the numbers of claimants 
and average awards had been rising for a 
number of years before the financial crisis 
hit. The increased spending on DLA largely 
reflects higher numbers of recipients (as 
real entitlements have hardly changed). 
Spending on tax credits has risen, by 
contrast, largely through policy decisions 
taken by the past government to increase 
entitlements for families with children in 
real terms. 
IMPACT
What will be the impact of these cuts? 
£2.5 billion will be saved in child benefit 
by freezing it for three years, and then 
means-testing it for the first time, by 
removing it from families containing a 
higher-rate income tax payer. But the 
particular form of means-testing has a 
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stock as well as new claimants, and expects 
it to reduce the number of claimants by a 
fifth. It is hard to object to the idea that 
DLA recipients should undergo a medical 
test, but clearly the move will make 
those worse off who in future are denied 
DLA. Second, the Government has also 
announced a reform to ESA which will 
mean that it will be paid for more than 
12 months only if a claimant is heavily 
disabled or if a claimant’s family has such 
a low income that they qualify for the 
means-tested variant of ESA. 
THEMES
Are there any overarching themes 
running through these benefit cuts? First, 
pensioners have been largely spared: the 
pension credit and basic state pension 
are not affected by the move to index 
benefits with the CPI, the stricter disability 
test for DLA will not apply to Attendance 
Allowance (the equivalent benefit for 
pensioners), and universal benefits for 
pensioners will continue in their non-
means-tested form. Secondly, although all 
working-age benefits have been cut back 
to some extent, the working-age benefit 
system as a whole will be more focused on 
the poorest as a result of these reforms. 
Third, those families receiving very large 
payments of benefits and tax credits will 
be particularly hard hit as a result of 
family, whether it qualifies for the working 
tax credit, and family income.
Much attention has been focused on the 
changes to local housing allowance (LHA). 
LHA rates are currently supposed to be set 
at the median level of rents in a local area; 
from April 2011, they will be set at the 30 
per cent centile, and subject to a nationwide 
cap on the level and on the property size. 
Virtually all LHA recipients will lose from 
these changes. Most should find, though, 
they can still afford around 30 per cent of 
rents in their area; the two groups who 
will see much bigger falls in their LHA 
payments are large households currently 
in properties with 5 or more bedrooms, 
and those living in Central London, where 
the nationwide caps will be binding. It is 
possible, of course, that reductions in LHA 
rates may lead landlords to reduce rents 
in response. Arguably a more important 
change will take place in 2013, from which 
point LHA rates will be linked to the CPI: 
this breaks the link between LHA rates and 
the level of local rents, and some have 
warned that this reform will lead to many 
areas being unaffordable to those on LHA 
in the medium- to long-term.
There are two reforms affecting disability 
benefits. First, the Government will be 
introducing a medical test into DLA, 
modelled on the existing test for ESA 
claimants. It will apply this to the existing 
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changes to Local Housing Allowance and 
the benefit cap. Inevitably, the poor will 
lose more as a percentage of income 
than the rich from such a large reduction 
in the overall welfare bill. And, as our 
distributional analysis of all tax and benefit 
changes to be introduced between now 
and 2014–15 in figure 1 shows, the tax 
rises announced by the Government are 
not sufficient to offset this pattern for the 
bottom 90 per cent of the population. It is 
important to recognise, though, that the 
hardest hit from tax and benefit reforms 
taking effect between now and 2014–15 
will be the very richest, mainly as a result 
of reforms pre-announced by the previous 
government. 
The Government initially claimed that 
its June 2010 Budget was progressive, 
but this was based on a distributional 
analysis of tax and benefit changes which 
omitted some of the largest welfare cuts 
(because the Treasury did not feel it could 
model precisely which households would 
be affected). The Government has also 
claimed that its measures will have no 
measurable impact on child poverty in 
2012-13. We have not yet assessed this 
second claim, but we have noted that 
the Treasury’s supporting analysis again 
omits many of the welfare cuts due in 
2012–13. And, given that there are more 
cuts to welfare benefits in 2012-13 and 
2014-15, it would be very surprising if the 
direct impact of the Government’s changes 
on child poverty was neutral by the end 
of the Parliament. The Government has 
said, though, that it is unfair to judge it 
on policies due by 2014-15 given that it 
has not made a final decision on the level 
of welfare benefits and tax allowances 
in that year. In particular, we now know 
that the Government intends to introduce 
a Universal Credit, replacing all means-
tested benefits and tax credits for those 
of working age, from 2013. In principle, a 
unified system of means-testing will save 
the Government money, reduce losses to 
fraud and error, and be simpler and more 
transparent for claimants. The Government 
also wants to strengthen the incentive to 
work facing benefit recipients, particularly 
for so-called mini-jobs. In the Spending 
Review, the Government set aside a total 
of £2 billion to pay for the costs of building 
new systems, and paying higher benefit 
entitlements to some claimants. Although 
we don’t have enough details to be sure, 
it seems likely that this reform will lead 
to some low-income families gaining. We 
hope this will become clearer when the 
Government legislates for the Universal 
Credit early in 2011.
Notes: Income decile groups are derived by dividing all households into 10 equal-sized 
groups according to income adjusted for household size using the McClements equivalence 
scale. Decile group 1 contains the poorest tenth of the population, decile group 2 the sec-
ond poorest, and so on up to decile group 10, which contains the richest tenth. Assumes 
increases in employer NICs are passed on to employees in the form of lower wages.
Sources: Authors’ calculations using TAXBEN run on the 2008–09 Family Resources Survey 
and 2008 Expenditure and Food Survey.
budget and the Comprehensive Spending 
Review (CSR). Indeed according to HM 
Treasury’s CSR website ‘The Spending 
Review sets out a new vision for a fairer 
Britain’ (2010a, accessed 16/11/10). What 
The Coalition Government has made considerable use of the concept of ‘fairness’ in support of its policies and, 
in particular, in justifying the package of 
public spending cuts announced in the June 
Fairness
Tania BurchardT, london school oF economics and 
poliTical science
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unclear. Assuming it refers to those who 
are currently children and young people, 
the size of public debt they inherit will be 
only one determinant of the potential their 
adult lives hold. The condition of public 
infrastructure (hospitals, schools, housing 
stock, railways and roads, etc) and the 
skills base of the workforce (trained 
doctors, teachers and engineers) will also 
be important. There is little advantage 
to having low public debt if you will not 
be able to be treated when you are sick, 
housed when you are homeless, or, less 
dramatically but no less importantly, 
unable to make a living because the basic 
services on which the economy depends 
are dilapidated, understaffed and under-
skilled. Physical and human capital are 
accumulated over periods of years and 
decades, but they can be undermined at 
the stroke of a Chancellor’s pen.
Moreover ‘the next generation’, however 
defined, is not homogenous. The children 
and grandchildren of today’s wealthy stand 
to inherit considerable private wealth, 
especially in the form of housing assets, 
and hence will be shielded from the long-
term impact of public spending cuts, 
while the children and grandchildren of 
today’s social housing tenants are likely 
to be dependant on public services and 
transfers to a much greater extent. Saving 
‘the next generation’ from high taxes 
to service a large public debt by cutting 
today’s and tomorrow’s public spending 
is of considerable advantage to the next 
generation of wealthy individuals and of 
doubtful advantage, and quite possibly 
significant disadvantage, to the remainder 
of the next generation. Raising the 
threshold for Inheritance Tax serves only 
to reinforce the inequality.
SOCIAL MOBILITY
This brings us to the Coalition’s claims to 
be promoting fairness through enhanced 
social mobility. Conservative politicians are 
fond of asserting that social mobility fell 
under New Labour, and this may indeed be 
the case, although there is no evidence as 
yet to support this claim. Social mobility – 
the extent to which children find themselves 
as adults in a different place in the social 
order, usually defined in terms of earnings 
or occupation, than their parents – takes a 
generation, literally, to become manifest. 
is meant by ‘fairness’ in this context has 
been less clear. Significant differences 
of interpretation are apparent in recent 
statements by the Prime Minister, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Chancellor: 
Cameron: ‘Fairness means giving people 
what they deserve – and what people 
deserve depends on how they behave.’ 
(speech to Conservative Party conference, 
6/10/10 – Conservatives 2010)
Clegg: ‘It is simply not acceptable that 
the circumstances of a child’s birth can 
become a life sentence of disadvantage.’ 
(announcing ‘fairness premium’, 
15/10/10 – Liberal Democrats 2010)
Osborne: ‘[F]airness – that we are all 
in this together and all must make a 
contribution. Fairness means creating a 
welfare system that helps the vulnerable, 
supports people into work, and is also 
affordable for the working families who 
pay for it from their taxes. Fairness also 
means that across the entire deficit 
reduction plan, those with the broadest 
shoulders should bear the greatest 
burden.  Those with the most should 
pay the most, including our banks.’ (CSR 
speech, 20/10/10 - HM Treasury 2010d)
‘There is nothing fair about running huge 
budget deficits, and burdening future 
generations with the debts we ourselves 
are not prepared to pay.’ (CSR speech, 
20/10/10 – HM Treasury 2010d)
Fairness, it seems, encompasses something 
about a concern with intergenerational 
justice, issues of social mobility, a principle 
of universal but progressive contributions, 
just deserts and the protection of the worst-
off. Almost any individual policy could be 
justified by appeal to one or more of these 
ideas, but if we take the package of tax and 
spending cuts as a whole, to what extent 
can they be seen as promoting any of these 
concepts of justice?
INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
Firstly, intergenerational justice. Great 
play has been made of the importance 
of not leaving ‘the next generation’ with 
huge public debt. But this is based on a 
rather narrow and superficial analysis. 
The definition of ‘the next generation’ is 
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Thirdly, international evidence suggests 
that countries with high inequality at a point 
in time (‘cross-sectional inequality’) tend 
to have low social mobility and countries 
with low cross-sectional inequality tend 
to have higher social mobility (Blanden, 
2009). This also makes sense intuitively: 
it is easier to climb a ladder if the steps 
are relatively close together. So one route 
to promoting social mobility would be to 
reduce inequality in the here and now. 
FAIRNESS
This brings us to the Coalition’s third 
interpretation of fairness – that they 
are protecting the most vulnerable, and 
ensuring the burden of cuts is borne by 
those with the ‘broadest shoulders’. Were 
this the case, it would be an equality-
promoting package and hence could 
also have a positive effect on social 
mobility. This concept of fairness is closely 
associated with the liberal egalitarian 
political philosopher John Rawls, whose 
‘maximin’ principle requires that priority 
be given to the worst off. To what extent 
does the package of cuts in the Budget and 
CSR meet this criterion? 
The analysis in Annex B of the Treasury’s 
Spending Review document (HM Treasury 
2010a), suggests that the combined effect 
of changes in taxes, benefits and services 
is mildly progressive by 2012-13, with the 
top fifth of the income distribution losing 
most (as a proportion of their combined 
income and the value of benefits-in-
kind they receive), while the one-but-
top fifth and the bottom fifth of the 
income distribution lose least. However, 
independent analysis by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (Browne and Levell 2010b) 
gives a rather different picture. The HMT 
analysis omits the impact of the reforms of 
Housing Benefit, Employment and Support 
Allowance, Disability Living Allowance and 
Council Tax Benefit, all of which are likely 
to have a larger negative effect on the 
poorest half of the income distribution. It 
also omits around two-thirds of the cuts 
to departmental spending, on the grounds 
that the impact on households cannot be 
clearly allocated. Moreover, the Treasury 
analysis of taxes and benefits stops at 
2012-13, leaving a further £10.7 billion of 
the proposed £18 billion welfare cuts still 
However, research on previous generations 
of young people going on into adulthood 
has revealed a number of factors that 
promote or hinder social mobility. Firstly, 
we know that experiencing unemployment 
early on in your labour market career 
has a long-term adverse effect on your 
earnings and employment chances, a so-
called ‘scarring effect’ (Gregg, 2001). 
Hence, the particularly high rates of youth 
unemployment during the current recession 
– reaching 21 per cent for men aged 18-
24, according to the Labour Force Survey 
- are likely to be extremely damaging for 
today’s young people not only in the here 
and now, but also for their prospects of 
achieving upwards social mobility. The loss 
of hundreds of thousands of public sector 
jobs and related private sector jobs just as 
the country is apparently emerging from 
recession is not offering a helping hand to 
these young people. 
Secondly, research has consistently pointed 
to the importance of education in promoting 
social mobility. The Coalition Government 
is protecting spending on schools, and this 
is certainly to be welcomed from a social 
mobility perspective, but in the modern 
‘knowledge economy’, higher education 
is also significant in determining future 
earnings and employment prospects. Here 
the Government’s proposals for a dramatic 
shift away from tax-funded support 
towards direct financing by individuals 
and families are likely to have a strongly 
unequal effect, reinforcing the link between 
the class background of your parents and 
your own chances of acquiring a degree. 
Many children from wealthier backgrounds 
will not be saddled with debt because their 
parents will be in a position to support 
them directly, while potential students from 
poorer backgrounds will need to make 
the difficult judgement about whether to 
risk incurring substantial debt to increase 
the chance of future higher earnings, or 
whether to play safe and start earning right 
away. The proposed extension of bursaries 
and scholarships is little more than a sop, 
since a young person from a disadvantaged 
background would need to jump through 
two hoops (university entrance and 
scholarship application, the latter most often 
with higher academic requirements), each 
associated with considerable uncertainty, 
while those in a more privileged position 
need only meet one set of criteria. 
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enforcement and keeping the peace. 
Instead, people are expected to come 
together in voluntary collectives and decide 
among themselves to support community 
projects - a vision which appears to have 
much in common with the ‘Big Society’. As 
critics of libertarian philosophy have been 
quick to point out, the effects are likely to 
be a polarisation between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’, particularly when the starting 
point is very unequal and when residential 
patterns overlap geographically with socio-
economic segregation. 
Yet this libertarian philosophy is ‘out of 
sync’ with the British public. Evidence from 
the British Social Attitudes survey has 
shown that nearly three-quarters (73 per 
cent) believe the gap between those with 
high and low incomes is too large, and a 
similar proportion (69 per cent) believe 
it is right that taxes paid by the majority 
help to support those in need (Sefton, 
2005). As the cuts begin to take effect, 
the underlying rationale of the Coalition’s 
policies will become ever more apparent. 
The expectation must be that it will also be 
increasingly unpopular, and that any claims 
of ‘fairness’ will soon ring hollow.
to come into force. Correcting for these 
limitations in the HMT analysis as far as 
possible – which necessitates making 
some assumptions about the future 
incidence of welfare cuts and about the 
value of services to different family types 
– Reed (2010) concludes that the bottom 
tenth of the income distribution will be 
hardest hit, losing around 11 per cent of 
their combined net income and the value 
of public services they receive per year, 
compared to approximately 4.5 per cent 
per year for the top tenth of the income 
distribution. 
Finally, we can consider whether the 
Coalition’s policies support the ‘just 
deserts’ interpretation of justice reflected 
in the Cameron quote at the beginning of 
this paper. This is perhaps closest to the 
libertarian theory of justice, associated 
with the political philosopher Robert Nozick, 
according to which people are entitled to 
the full fruits of their labour and to their 
assets, provided they have been obtained 
through fair exchange. Hence there is no 
justification for compulsory redistribution, 
or taxation to fund public goods. The 
role of the state is limited to contract 
significant, and can lead to major problems 
in the delivery of welfare services. Targeting 
aims to focus support only upon those who 
are in need. This can mean targeting by 
need, for example, the support services 
provided for some people with disabilities. 
More usually, however, it tends to mean 
targeting support upon those unable to 
provide for themselves because of low 
income or lack of independent income, and 
it requires those seeking such support to 
undergo a test of their means to determine 
entitlement. 
Such means-tests are relatively expensive 
to administer, because they require detailed, 
and ongoing, checks in order to determine 
Targeting and universalism are issues at the centre of social policy practice and analysis. We have both targeting 
and universalism within our welfare 
system, and policy development seeks to 
balance a constant tension between the 
two. This tension contains both practical 
implications and clashes of principle. In 
practice it matters because the choice 
between targeting and universalism has 
major consequences for the way welfare 
services are designed and delivered. In 
principle the different approaches address 
central concerns of social policy in very 
different ways. 
The practical consequences of targeting are 
TargeTing and universalism
peTe alcocK, universiTy oF Birmingham
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for some recipients, which in extreme cases 
could exceed 90 per cent. That is, for each 
extra pound earned, up to 90 pence could 
be lost through withdrawal of credits and 
other forms of means-tested support.
The planned changes to Housing Benefit 
are being made in part to minimise the 
problems caused by higher benefit levels for 
the unemployed than for those on low pay 
– without raising support for the low paid 
which would exacerbate the poverty trap. 
However, these changes seem likely to price 
these Housing Benefit claimants out of the 
housing market in many inner city areas, 
leading to evictions and re-housing – again 
potentially with higher costs elsewhere 
and increased administrative intervention. 
Whatever the desirability in principle, 
more targeting inevitably leads to greater 
practical problems.
However, there are issues of principle 
too. The new Government has stated its 
commitment to policy being driven by a 
concern for fairness. Targeting is fair in 
one sense, they suggest, because it pays 
each according to their needs. But this 
raises difficult questions about what is 
need, and who decides this. In the case 
of Child Benefit, for instance, arguably 
it is the children’s needs which are being 
met, through payment to their carer – and 
children’s basic needs are the same whatever 
the circumstances of their parents. More 
generally though there is a social dimension 
to need, and to benefit. Child Benefit is also 
an investment in future generations for 
everyone’s benefit – we all need children to 
grow up fit, healthy and well cared for. So 
is it fair to target the high rate taxpayers 
with children for an increased contribution 
to this investment, rather than higher rate 
taxpayers in general?
This raises the more general question about 
who pays for, as well as who benefits from, 
welfare services; and here the principles 
of equality and inclusion also compete 
with fairness. Any commitment to equality 
within welfare provision requires us to 
pay attention to who pays as well as who 
benefits, as the collective investment in 
children demonstrates. If the notion of 
fairness does not also embrace this, then 
it is only addressing one part of the welfare 
contract – and the absence of focus on 
taxation policy within the Spending Review 
entitlement. These are complex for claimants 
as well as administrators. They can lead to 
problems with take-up – not all those who 
might in theory be entitled actually receive 
the support they need because of the 
complexity of entitlement. They can also 
lead to high levels of error and fraud, where 
complex circumstances are inadvertently or 
deliberately misrepresented. Targeting also 
produces what commentators have called 
the ‘Poverty Trap’. This is the consequence 
of targeting support upon those with low 
incomes, which means that this support 
must be withdrawn if income rises. As 
a result little real benefit is felt by those 
securing an increase in their income, and in 
effect they remain trapped in poverty.
The practical problems of targeting are 
all well known and well documented in 
academic social policy debate, although 
not often understood outside of this. From 
an administrative point of view therefore 
targeted provision is always in practice 
second best. Universalism is simpler 
and easier because it provides the same 
support to everyone. However, this means 
supporting people who have extensive 
resources and could easily purchase such 
support themselves. Thus universal Child 
Benefit is paid to the Prime Minister (or 
more likely to his wife, as it is normally paid 
to the major carer), despite the fact that 
they are millionaires and do not need this 
extra money. Especially at times of public 
austerity this does not look like a prudent 
use of scarce resources; and this is just what 
the Coalition Government has concluded in 
its Spending Review, promising to withdraw 
Child Benefit from high rate taxpayers and 
tighten the targeting criteria for tax credits 
and benefits such as Housing Benefit.  
Predictably, however, the practical problems 
with such further moves towards targeting 
quickly come to the fore. Already the 
Government is having problems matching 
up the high rate taxpayers (often men) with 
the Child Benefit recipients (often women), 
because taxation is administered on an 
individual basis – leading to more intrusion 
and confusion within the tax system, 
and greater administrative costs. Tighter 
limits on tax credits will have the effect of 
steepening significantly the poverty trap, 
as explained by Brewer and Browne, with 
closer focusing of credits on the lowest paid 
likely to lead to higher marginal tax rates 
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suggests such a narrower approach may at 
the moment be more influential. 
Who pays for welfare matters for another 
reason, however; and this is because it is 
through paying for, as well as benefitting 
from, welfare services that all citizens feel 
included in them. One of the reasons for the 
continuing popularity and high engagement 
with the NHS is the fact that all pay for, and 
benefit from, it. It was also the principle 
behind Beveridge’s National Insurance (NI) 
scheme, established at the same time, and 
this remains a continuing source of popular 
support for NI through the belief that 
contributors have paid for their pensions 
or other benefits. Although in practice the 
complexity of NI entitlement makes this 
relationship less effective on the ground, and 
its legitimacy was undermined by Labour 
Government increases in contributions to 
meet more general taxation needs. 
Universal services are popular because 
all are included within and contribute 
to them; and, ironically, this appeals to 
another notion of fairness – that paying for 
something justifies benefitting from it. It 
makes it easier to equalise benefits, since all 
get the same, whilst redistributing through 
contributions, since all pay what they can 
afford. It also promotes inclusion as all are 
both paying for and benefiting from public 
support, whereas targeted support has 
sometimes been associated with stigma for 
those receiving benefits which are seen to 
be ‘only for the poor’.
The role of targeting has been growing 
significantly within social policy for some 
time now, and the Spending Reviews are 
likely to accentuate this drift. Nevertheless 
the principles of universalism remain 
central to much social policy delivery and 
debate. The tension between targeting and 
universalism continues to be very much in 
balance therefore. Support for universalism 
could be encouraged through appeals to 
the alternative approach to the principles 
of fairness and inclusion that it offers – 
fair because all do over time contribute to 
cost of services and benefits, and inclusive 
because all benefit from them. At the same 
time the practical problems of targeting in 
high administrative costs, failure to take-up 
entitlement and high marginal tax rates, will 
be likely to dominate the delivery of means-
tested support. When concerns over these 
arise, as inevitably they will, policy makers 
will know that there is an alternative.
one that is not being taken by anyone who 
has a choice in the matter. The weaker 
Mediterranean and Celtic governments are 
not in a position to preserve their social 
settlements because they cannot maintain 
the incomes from taxation or borrowing to 
do so. The British experiment may work, 
in the sense of restoring growth. If it does 
we will undergo a painful transition, but 
wake up in a very different world, one that 
is more competitive and more prosperous 
but more unequal. Restructured Britain 
will be able to offer good lives to the 
advantaged but not to more vulnerable 
groups, and will be less humane than 
Europe at its best.
Britain has abandoned its attempt to join the European tradition of state welfare and is making a decisive 
move towards the US/liberal model of 
market capitalism. This is implicit in the 
discussion of policies in various areas 
elsewhere in this volume. It emerges 
clearly when patterns of overall spending, 
privatisation, management of the labour 
market, social divisions and insecurity are 
considered. The British approach offers 
a qualitatively different solution to the 
problem that faces all advanced economies: 
how to maintain competitive position in an 
expanding world, where other economies 
are growing rapidly. It is a gamble and 
The uK welFare sTaTe going wesT
peTer Taylor-gooBy, universiTy oF KenT
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increases elsewhere in Europe tended to 
include a much greater proportion of labour 
market subsidies, most notably the state-
financed ‘training schemes’ that effectively 
took many core workers off company 
payrolls at the height of the downturn in 
Germany, France and Italy. These have 
been followed by measures to reduce social 
insurance contributions and help particular 
groups, younger unemployed people and 
long-term unemployed (OECD, 2010).
Where the UK stands out is in the 
spending trajectory after 2009-10 (see 
Figure 2). The combination of the previous 
government’s March 2010 Budget, the 
June 2010 Emergency Budget and the 
September 2010 Comprehensive Spending 
Review set state spending on a downward 
course steeper than in any major 
European country, so that it falls below 
G7 levels and that of the US by 2014-
15. The G7 includes Germany, France, 
Italy and Canada, as well as the US and 
Japan, so a position below spending levels 
averaged across these countries is not a 
new experience (but one that is instructive 
to those considering how the UK stands in 
international comparison). What should be 
noted is that this is the first time UK public 
spending has ever fallen below that in the 
US. This fact brings home how substantial 
SPENDING TRAJECTORIES
The overall pattern of public spending 
across Western economies in the early 
years of this century was of a more or less 
steady state in the context of continuing 
growth. This was succeeded by a sharp 
rise from 2007-8 in response to the 
demands to rescue favoured industries, 
provide investment capital and manage 
unemployment. Spending follows the usual 
cyclical pattern of spending, relatively 
lower when GDP rises rapidly, higher 
during recession, because GDP is relatively 
lower and the demands are greater. It is 
exaggerated by the scale of the crisis.
Public spending in the UK had been 
climbing painfully from the low position 
of the late 1990s towards the level of 
the more developed European countries. 
This reflects reforms to expand the NHS, 
education and social care, and tax credit 
and other subsidies towards those on lower 
incomes and improvements in pensions. 
In common with many countries, spending 
ceased to rise from 2004-5 so that the 
(limited) progress towards a mitigation 
of poverty came to an end. The UK and 
US with their relatively large and needy 
financial sectors experienced a particularly 
rapid rise in demands on the exchequer 
between 2007 and 2009. The spending 
Figure 2: Public Spending Trends, Selected Advanced Economies 2008-15 IMF (per cent GDP)
Source: IMF (2010)
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One feature of the changes is that the UK Government has decided to reduce support for the 
economy more rapidly than any other major economy. Centre-right commentators 
sometimes interpr t the cuts package as simply a return to the normal British p tt rn. Aft r 
all, spending during the years of growth in the late 1980s, l te 1990s and early 2000s was at 
about the 40 per cent level. This argument misses the point.  
First, the period in which spending in the UK is to  abruptly cut back is not exp cted to be 
a boom, but rather a c utious return to growth, with high l vels of nemployment imposing 
particular demands on the state. Seco d, as other cha ters point out, the cuts for the mass 
services, health car , education and pensions, will be much less severe than for the benefits 
directed at low inc me minorities. The protected areas account for about half of all public 
spending. The 2009-15 cuts impact on poor groups in a way that previou  cyclical shifts in 
public spending have not. The shift way from Europea  soci l pr tection and solidarity is 
part of a programme that imposes a more insecure, market-centred system. 
The spendi g cuts and competition rules in relation to local government open up 
opportunities for private providers to take over services, and make it increasingly difficult for 
local authorities who wish to keep provision in-house. It seems likely that many GP consortia 
will not have the resources to manage services effectively in the new NHS and will use 
private companies to do so. The move to extend academy status eventually across all state 
schools opens up a range of opportunities for private education management firms. The free 
schools currently under consideration will be mostly run by private companies. In higher 
education the Browne review signals a shift to a largely market-centred user-financed 
system. The Government has indicated openness to private providers to attain university 
status.  
Benefit reforms are designed to sharpen work incentives yet further. These pressures will be 
extended to substantial numbers among those currently receiving sickness and disability 
benefits. Related reforms to tax-credit, rent benefits and to social housing and the greater 
targeting of the more universal benefits will intensify the difficulties faced by those at the 
bottom further. 
14 In Defence of Welfare: The Impacts of the Spending Review
The New Politics of Welfare
will be extended to substantial numbers 
among those currently receiving sickness 
and disability benefits. Related reforms 
to tax-credit, rent benefits and to social 
housing and the greater targeting of the 
more universal benefits will intensify the 
difficulties faced by those at the bottom 
further.
These changes are likely to be associated 
with further social divisions and a 
continuation of the pattern of growing 
inequality traced by Atkinson (2007) 
across advanced countries during the 
past quarter-century. In particular the 
imposition of greater costs for child care 
(through cut-back of schemes), higher 
education, and housing (through rent 
benefit reforms and the move to 80 per 
cent market rents for new social housing) 
will damage those towards the bottom, but 
not better-off groups.
The shift towards the market, the 
contraction of state sector and expansion of 
private sector employment and the current 
likelihood that employment protection will 
be weakened will lead to greater insecurity 
in many people’s lives.
THE NEW GROWTH MODEL
These changes are sometimes seen as 
the normal centre-right market-centred 
programme, facilitated by the opportunity 
to advance an exceptionally stringent 
cuts package that the crisis offers. An 
alternative approach is to understand them 
as a conscious restructuring, intended 
to resolve a long-standing problem. 
The UK, like many western countries, 
flourished during the first 19th century 
era of globalisation through industrial, 
imperial and military pre-eminence. That 
era ended in the conflicts between the post 
imperial powers of the first half of the 20th 
century. The post second world war boom 
under US hegemony provided 30 years of 
stability. From the 1970s globalisation has 
reasserted itself, this time with the centres 
of economic dynamism elsewhere. 
Europe (and the UK) may continue to 
achieve real growth. In fact the UK grew 
rather faster than the main European 
economies during the boom between 1997 
and 2008. The problem is one of relative 
decline, as centres elsewhere grow much 
a shift is contained in the current policy 
package.
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW POLICIES
One feature of the changes is that the 
UK Government has decided to reduce 
support for the economy more rapidly 
than any other major economy. Centre-
right commentators sometimes interpret 
the cuts package as simply a return to the 
normal British pattern. After all, spending 
during the years of growth in the late 
1980s, late 1990s and early 2000s was at 
about the 40 per cent level. This argument 
misses the point. 
First, the period in which spending in the UK 
is to be abruptly cut back is not expected to 
be a boom, but rather a cautious return to 
growth, with high levels of unemployment 
imposing particular demands on the state. 
Second, as other chapters point out, the 
cuts for the mass services, health care, 
education and pensions, will be much less 
severe than for the benefits directed at low 
income minorities. The protected areas 
account for about half of all public spending. 
The 2009-15 cuts impact on poor groups in 
a way that previous cyclical shifts in public 
spending have not. The shift away from 
European social protection and solidarity is 
part of a programme that imposes a more 
insecure, market-centred system.
The spending cuts and competition rules 
in relation to local government open up 
opportunities for private providers to take 
over services, and make it increasingly 
difficult for local authorities who wish to 
keep provision in-house. It seems likely 
that many GP consortia will not have the 
resources to manage services effectively in 
the new NHS and will use private companies 
to do so. The move to extend academy 
status eventually across all state schools 
opens up a range of opportunities for 
private education management firms. The 
free schools currently under consideration 
will be mostly run by private companies. In 
higher education the Browne review signals 
a shift to a largely market-centred user-
financed system. The Government has 
indicated openness to private providers to 
attain university status. 
Benefit reforms are designed to sharpen 
work incentives yet further. These pressures 
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rests on achieving competitiveness by 
offering low taxes, a deregulated market-
place and a relatively cheap and highly-
motivated work-force for a country at a 
north European level of development. 
Leading to sharp and continuing cuts in the 
social wage, a weakening of employment 
protection and the intrusion of market-
competitiveness across society – and 
perhaps a more dynamic and fluid society. 
If you can’t beat the leading European 
powers at their game, you might as well 
try the American model.
The US has had growth of about 100 
per cent during the past 30 years and 
productivity gains of over 80 per cent, 
but the incomes of most of the population 
have only risen by 9 per cent. Median full-
time men’s wages have been largely static 
and this limited rise is a real increase in 
women’s wages (Wasow, 2008). The gains 
of economic progress have gone almost 
entirely to the top 20 per cent, most of 
them to the top two per cent (Hacker 
and Pierson, 2010). Advocates of the US 
solution should remember that, in liberal 
competitive capitalism with a weak labour 
movement and limited social protection, 
it’s the rich that gets the gravy.
faster. The UK’s share of world total GDP 
shrank from about four and a quarter per 
cent in 1980 to two and three-quarter per 
cent by 2010 and is predicted to continue to 
decline (IMF, 2010). This is what underlies 
the fear that the loss of the political and 
military power associated with economic 
domination condemns Britain to backwater 
status. One response is that of Germany 
and to some extent France and associated 
countries: an integrated corporatist 
welfare model that sustains high value-
added, high productivity export industries, 
able to retain comparative advantage by 
competing on quality.
Britain has gradually lost its position as 
a major exporter. One possible growth 
path sought to emulate Germany with the 
welfare state conceived as investment in 
human capital. Such policies, under Wilson 
and Blair, have not provided the basis for 
stable growth. Another approach highlights 
the contribution of the new service sector 
industries, notably the finance sector. 
These have failed to generate wealth 
in sufficient volumes or with sufficient 
stability to secure national prosperity. The 
welfare reforms are best understood as 
part of a different growth strategy. This 
is adept at dealing with callousness. His 
immediate reaction to the cheering that 
greeted the Government announcements 
was that for many Coalition MPs it was now 
obvious that ‘this is what they came into 
politics for’. George Osborne (39), who 
became an MP in 2001, ended his speech 
saying he had brought sanity to our public 
finances and civility to our economy. The 
printed version of his speech suggests 
the word was ‘stability’, not ‘civility’, but 
George was mumbling at that point and I 
think that he thinks he is civilised.
Osborne announced that housing benefit 
will not be paid for people under the age of 
The Comprehensive Spending Review announced the start of a new era of engineered social polarisation; 
a further separation of the lives, hopes, 
homes and chances of rich and poor.
One of the first announcements was that 
new tenants of council and other social 
housing will now have to pay at least 80 
percent of market prices in rent. In one 
stroke millions of low paid families are to 
be excluded from living in hundreds of 
towns, cities and villages where they no 
longer earn enough to ‘deserve’ to be.
At age 60, shadow Chancellor Alan Johnston 
clearing The poor away
danny dorling, universiTy oF sheFField
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when combined with all the Chancellor’s 
other measures, means that child poverty 
will rise - despite what he suggested in 
this speech. 
But not everyone loses out. More affluent 
savers who lost money they invested 
in Equitable Life and the Presbyterian 
Mutual Society will soon receive £1.7 
billion from tax payers - mostly from tax 
payers poorer than them. Thus money is 
being redistributed towards the affluent. 
And there will be more property for the 
affluent to buy with these windfalls in and 
around London, in villages and in market 
towns, as the poor vacate their homes for 
cheaper places to live.
Raising the cap on train fares will mean 
that those who do move out to make ends 
meet will end up paying even more to get 
into London and other cities for work. Local 
government will be allowed to borrow more 
in richer areas, against expected business 
rates, instead of Westminster borrowing, 
so that the places where business makes 
a lot of money can be spruced up. Local 
government in poorer areas cannot make 
such newly permitted borrowing.
George Osborne (39) is younger than me, 
and I am still a relatively young university 
professor. His work experience has been 
limited to shelf-stacking and a few weeks 
of filing in the NHS. Danny Alexander, the 
chief secretary to the treasury, is even 
younger (38). For a year he had a job 
outside of politics, doing PR for a national 
park. Between them, these inexperienced 
young men - who as far as I know have 
never been on the dole - announced a 
huge raft of cuts which their own figures 
say will directly make half a million public 
servants redundant.
The former Conservative Chancellor, and 
current secretary of state for justice, 
Ken Clark (69), had warned of a double-
dip recession if cuts were savage. On 
21 October, Teresa Perchard, director 
of policy at the Citizens Advice Bureau, 
warned that housing benefit changes 
would ‘create a group of nomads…maybe 
not where the jobs are.’ On the same BBC 
radio programme, Alan Johnston said that 
Osborne’s speech was ‘unfair, unwise and 
untruthful in some of the statistics’ and 
that the Chancellor was ‘asking children 
35 who live alone - this previously applied 
only to those under 25. There would be a 
10 per cent cut in council tax benefit for 
those who can not afford to live in certain 
areas. The few remaining people living 
on modest incomes near affluent suburbs 
or in economically successful towns and 
villages are to be cleansed away.
We now know that the Spending Review 
is at least as regressive as the June 
budget, as were the cuts announced for 
local council core funding. The best-off 
fifth of society will lose just 1 percent of 
their entitlements to public services and 
spending, the lowest losses of any group. 
Furthermore, a million people currently on 
employment and support allowance due to 
ill health will each loose £2,000 a year if 
they cannot find a job. Osborne announced 
further privatisation of pensions, with the 
state pension age rising rapidly to 66 years. 
Only those with private provision can now 
retire at the normal age. Public sector 
pensioners will have £1.8 billion removed 
from them by 2014-15. This will further 
impoverish many of that group. Pension 
credits will be frozen for three years. 
No family on benefits is to receive more 
than the income of an average family in 
work, no matter what the circumstances 
of their children. If you are poor - or are 
made poor when you lose your job or have 
a pay cut forced on you - and have three 
or more children, you may need to leave 
your town for a new life in a cheaper area, 
away from where the remaining well paid 
work is.
Understanding demographic trends is 
crucial to understanding the review. 
Provision for the NHS did not include the 
extra costs of the 1946 baby boomers 
retiring, or the cost of new privatisations 
being introduced there (which were not 
even in the Tory manifesto). Provision 
for education would not maintain current 
rates of spending per child once the new 
privatised ‘free’ school costs are added 
in. University places will be slashed, but 
75,000 more apprenticeships are to be 
created for the children of the more-
deserving, better-behaved poor - those 
who know their place. The educational 
maintenance allowance for less well-
off children will be phased out, another 
significant cut to children’s finances which, 
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(and people made newly poor) from more 
prosperous areas of the country. Many 
younger people will now go abroad to 
find work or a university place. Many of 
them will never return. Poorer families will 
struggle the most, but fewer will be visible 
through the windows of ministerial cars. 
This is how you break a society.
to make a bigger contribution than the 
banks’. 
There were a huge number of alternatives 
to what took place on Wednesday 20 
October 2010, but few of those alternatives 
would have resulted in the clearing and 
cleansing out of so many poorer people 
This article is reproduced by kind permission of Socialist Review
implicaTions For speciFic  
groups and policies
material deprivation between 2004/5 
and 2008/9.
•   Over the period since 1997 there 
has been a significant change in 
the composition of poor children. In 
1996/97 55 per cent lived in workless 
families. By 2008/09 only 41 per cent 
lived in workless families (before 
housing costs). 
Child poverty needs to fall by 1.1 million 
between 2008/09 and 2010/11 to meet 
the 2010 target of halving child poverty. 
Poor children may have benefited from the 
falling level of inflation in 2009/10 which 
meant that benefits and tax credits grew 
in real terms. The bringing forward of 
the April 2010 uprating might also have 
helped. However this is likely to have 
been offset by growing unemployment in 
2009/10 and increasing inflation in 2010. 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (Brewer 
et al., 2009) had predicted a fall in the 
number of children in poverty by a further 
600,000 by 2010/11 given announced 
policies, but Joyce et al (2010) for IFS now 
believe this prediction is too optimistic. 
THE STATE OF CHILD POVERTY AT THE 
GENERAL ELECTION
The Labour Government’s aspiration to 
halve child poverty by 2010/11 is not 
going to be met. The strategy ran out 
of steam after they had (just) failed to 
meet the five year target to reduce child 
poverty by a quarter by 2004/5. At the 
time of writing, the latest data we have 
is Households Below Average Income for 
2008/9. It shows that 
•   There was no reduction in the 
percentage of children living below 
60 per cent of contemporary median 
income between 2003/4 and 2008/9, 
either before or after housing costs.
•   There was no reduction in the 
percentage of children living below 
60 per cent of the 1998/99 median 
income held constant in real terms 
between 2004/5 and 2008/9 after 
housing costs and a 1 per cent 
reduction before housing costs.
•   There was no reduction in the 
percentage of children falling below 
the thresholds of low income and 
child poverTy
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free school meals to poor families in 
employment.
•   Withdrawing Child Benefit from higher 
rate tax payers will not hurt the poor 
in the short-term but child benefit 
may suffer in the long term.
•   Freezing Child Benefit for three years 
from 2011.
•   Freezing Working Tax Credit for three 
years.
•   Removing the baby element and 
proposed toddler element in Child Tax 
Credit.
•   Lone parents to be expected to look 
for work once their youngest child 
reaches school age, from October 
2011
•   Surestart maternity grant restricted 
to the first child only.
•   A £2500 disregard will be introduced 
into Tax Credit for in-year falls 
in income and in-year rises in 
income that will be disregarded 
from calculations of Tax Credit, will 
decrease from £25,000 to £10,000 in 
2011 and then to £5000 in 2013.
•   Cutting spending on Council Tax 
Benefit and making it a local function.
•   Introducing a benefit cap will reduce 
the incomes of large families with 
children – the Government estimates 
50,000.
•   Increasing VAT from 17.5 to 20 per 
cent.
•   Introducing a Housing Benefit cap and 
reduction in local housing allowances. 
•   Withdrawing entitlement to Working 
Tax Credit of couples with children 
working 16-24 hours per week.
•   Uprating all benefits in line with the 
CPI instead of the RPI or Rossi index. 
The Government has launched a 
consultation on its approach to ending child 
poverty and improving life chances(http://
www.education.gov.uk/consultations/
index.cfm?action=consultationDetails&
consultationId=1737&external=no&me
nu=1).  As part of this the independent 
Child Poverty Commission, which was 
required under the Child Poverty Act, is 
being reviewed. Meanwhile the Frank 
Field Independent Review of Poverty 
and Life Chances (http://povertyreview.
independent.gov.uk/media/20254/
poverty-report.pdf) has been published 
including recommendations to: invest 
in a Foundation Stage using resources 
Even if it was achieved the number of 
children in poverty in 2010/11 would still 
exceed the target by 600,000.
The Child Poverty Act was passed just 
before the General Election with all party 
support. It sets clear and specific legal 
targets to eradicate child poverty by 
2020. The Act requires the Government to 
publish a national strategy by 25 March 
2011. 
NOW THE CUTS
The Government has decided to reduce 
the deficit by £81 billion by 2014/15. It 
chose to achieve this by taking 80 per 
cent from spending and 20 per cent from 
tax increases – though it looks now as 
if that balance is going to be 73/27 per 
cent. We now have had the emergency 
budget of June 2010 and the results of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review on 20 
October 2010.
There are three announcements that will 
help child poverty 
•   The child element of child tax credit 
will be uprated by £180 per year 
above indexation in 2011/12 and 
£110 above indexation in 2012/13.
•   The income tax personal allowance 
threshold will increase by £1000 in 
20011/12 and will benefit earners 
with incomes above the tax threshold, 
not just those with children.
•   The 1 per cent increase in national 
insurance contributions announced 
by the previous government has 
been scrapped. This helps all earners 
above the threshold.
Below is a much longer list of measures 
that are likely to increase child poverty. 
They are in no particular order:
•   The maximum limit of childcare costs 
met under Working Tax Credit will be 
reduced from 80 per cent to 70 per 
cent - this could cost families up to 
£30 per week.
•   Abolishing Educational Maintenance 
Allowances before the school leaving 
age is increased.
•   Abolishing the Health in Pregnancy 
Grant. 
•   Abolishing Child Trust Funds.
•   Reneging on the previous 
government’s commitment to extend 
19In Defence of Welfare: The Impacts of the Spending Review
Implicationations for Specific Group and Polices
Overall the distributional consequences of 
the measures are regressive (Browne and 
Levell, 2010b) (though the Government 
seeks to deny this). The Government has 
claimed that the Spending Review had no 
‘measurable’ impact on child poverty in the 
next two years. What happens then? From 
a fairness perspective it looks as though 
pensioners have emerged relatively 
unscathed while poor women and children 
are hit hardest. 
that would go to child cash benefits; 
and introduce a new set of Life Chances 
Indicators.
It will take some time to assess fully the 
overall impact of this package but the work 
has begun (Family Action, 2010). There is 
also the impact on poor children of cuts in 
capital spending, general central and local 
government services (such as Surestart), 
and the loss of 500,000 public sector jobs. 
disproportionately on the public services 
women use as well as on their jobs and 
incomes. The cuts amount to an immense 
reduction in the standard of living and 
financial independence of millions of 
women. Collaboration with Howard Reed, 
Landman Economics, enabled the WBG 
to produce the first gendered impact 
assessment of the cuts to public services 
by examining the distribution of the 
cuts between households with different 
gender characteristics (ibid). We find that 
the groups that will suffer the greatest 
reduction in their standard of living due 
to cuts in public services are lone parents 
and single pensioners, the majority of 
whom are women. Lone parents will lose 
services worth 18.5 per cent and female 
single pensioners, services worth 12 per 
cent of their respective incomes (see 
figure 3). 
Overall, single women will lose services 
worth 60 per cent more than the value of 
services single men will lose as proportions 
of their respective incomes, and nearly 
three times those lost by couples (see 
figure 4).
JOB LOSSES
Using data from the Labour Force Survey, 
the WBG finds that the cuts will lead to 
hundreds of thousands of job losses for 
The UK Women’s Budget Group (WBG) welcomes the emphasis that the Coalition has placed in the Spending 
Review on fairness and social mobility. The 
extension of 15 hours free early education 
and care to all disadvantaged 2-3 year 
olds from 2012-13 is to be applauded. 
However, its approach to fairness fails to 
acknowledge that men and women start 
from unequal positions, and that there 
are many barriers to social mobility other 
than lack of educational qualifications. 
Unequal employment opportunities and 
unpaid caring responsibilities are just two 
examples. 
We also welcome the Treasury’s attempt to 
produce an Equalities Impact Assessment 
of its spending decisions, following its 
failure to comply with this legal requirement 
for the June Emergency Budget. But we 
find its Impact Assessment inadequate. It 
provides almost no quantitative data on 
how men and women will be affected by 
its decisions and it excludes most aspects 
of the Spending Review, claiming either 
that there is no impact or that the impact 
is impossible to measure. 
The Women’s Budget Group has produced 
its own Gender Impact Assessment of 
the Spending Review (WBG, 2010) and 
finds that the record cuts to the public 
sector services and welfare budget impact 
women 
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53 per cent of Housing Benefit claimants 
are single women. Both benefits have 
been cut significantly in real terms and 
eligibility has been tightened. Also, the 
childcare component of the Working Tax 
Credit has been reduced from 80 per cent 
to 70 per cent of costs and couples will be 
required to work longer hours – from 16 
to 24 – before they are entitled to this. 
BEARING THE BRUNT
Despite the Coalition’s expectation that 
‘all sections of society who are able to 
do so contribute to deficit reduction’ 
women as 53 per cent of the jobs in 
the public sector services that have not 
been protected from the cuts are held by 
women. What is more, women’s levels 
of pay and conditions of employment 
are worse in those parts of the public 
sector which have been protected from 
cuts, meaning that women’s conditions of 
employment are set to deteriorate overall. 
The WBG’s analysis of the cuts in 
welfare spending finds that these will 
fall disproportionately on the finances 
of women. For example: Child Benefit is 
paid almost 100 per cent to women, while 
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Overall, single women will lose services worth 60 per cent more than the value of services 
single men will lose as proportions of their respective incomes, and nearly three times those 
lost by couples (see figure 4). 
Job losses 
Using data from the Labour Force Survey, the WBG finds that the cuts will lead to hundreds 
of thousands of job losses for women as 53 per cent of the jobs in the public sector services 
that have not been protected from the cuts are held by women. What is more, women’s 
levels of pay and conditions of employment are worse in those parts of the public sector 
which have been protected from cuts, meaning that women’s conditions of employment are 
set to deteriorate overall.  
The WBG’s analysis of the cuts in welfare spending finds that these will fall 
disproportionately on the finances of women. For example: Child Benefit is paid almost 100 
per cent to women, while 53 per cent of Housing Benefit claimants are single wom n. Both 
benefits have been cut significantly in real terms and eligibility has been tightened. Also, the 
childcare component of the Working Tax Credit has been reduced from 80 per cent to 70 per 
cent of costs and couples will be required to work longer hours – from 16 to 24 – before they 
are entitled to this.  
Bearing the brunt 
Despite the Coalition’s expectation that ‘all sections of society who are able to do so 
contribute to deficit reduction’ (HM Treasury, 2010a: 27) it is clear that women are bearing 
the brunt of the cuts. The Government claims that there is no alternative. Ian Duncan Smith 
said that the alternative to clawing back Child Benefit from families with a higher-rate tax 
payer would have been to raise income taxes, which people would not have liked either. But 
he forgets that non-parents pay income tax too, so any such tax rise would be spread more 
widely and therefore smaller. A tax rise would not have impacted on those women looking 
after children full-time who have no other income of their own, while clawing back Child 
Benefit will leave many without any independent resources.  
Another option would be a Robin Hood tax on financial transactions, so called because it 
takes from the rich and (potentially) gives to the poor. This could be turned into a ‘Maid 
Marion’ tax by ensuring that the revenue from the tax is used to avoid the cuts in benefits 
and public services that are so damaging to women. Even at the extremely low rate of 
Source: WBG and Howard Reed
Figure 4: Distribution of cuts among single women, single men and couples, as a per cent of net 
income, all services.
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Figure 3: Effects of spending cuts by family type: as per cent of net income, all services
Source: Howard Reed
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public services that are so damaging to 
women. Even at the extremely low rate of 
0.01percent, net revenues of £25 billion 
per year could easily be raised, enabling 
the Government to avoid some of its most 
damaging spending measures on women 
and their children. 
The Coalition needs to rethink its approach 
to managing the deficit if it wants to be 
judged as fair. Placing more of an emphasis 
on raising taxes on those who can afford 
to pay them rather than radically cutting 
services and welfare expenditure for 
women and their families is a fairer way 
to spread the burden of the deficit. In the 
meantime, the WBG calls on the Coalition 
to: stop its unfair attack on women’s jobs, 
incomes and services; deliver a Gender 
Impact Assessment that provides a full 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
gendered effects of the Spending Review 
and; take action now to mitigate the 
unfair burden of the Coalition’s Budget and 
Spending Review on women.
(HM Treasury, 2010a: 27) it is clear that 
women are bearing the brunt of the cuts. 
The Government claims that there is no 
alternative. Ian Duncan Smith said that 
the alternative to clawing back Child 
Benefit from families with a higher-
rate tax payer would have been to raise 
income taxes, which people would not 
have liked either. But he forgets that non-
parents pay income tax too, so any such 
tax rise would be spread more widely and 
therefore smaller. A tax rise would not 
have impacted on those women looking 
after children full-time who have no other 
income of their own, while clawing back 
Child Benefit will leave many without any 
independent resources. 
Another option would be a Robin Hood 
tax on financial transactions, so called 
because it takes from the rich and 
(potentially) gives to the poor. This could 
be turned into a ‘Maid Marion’ tax by 
ensuring that the revenue from the tax 
is used to avoid the cuts in benefits and 
therefore, in comparison with other EU 
countries, the UK has a high at risk of 
poverty rate among older people: 30 per 
cent compared with an EU average of 20 
per cent, 17 per cent in Germany, 13 per 
cent in France and 11 per cent in Sweden 
(European Commission, 2010).
Against this backcloth, how will older people 
be affected by the Coalition Government’s 
reforms? This section will focus on only two 
components for pensioners’ living standards: 
incomes and social services, which leaves 
out other important determinants of their 
quality of life (Walker, 2006). Thanks to 
analysis by the IFS (Brown and Levell, 
2010b) we can be certain about the effects 
of the changes to taxes and benefits, the 
income side, but much less so with regard 
to services because the precise impact 
The measures announced in the Emergency Budget and Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR) have to be viewed in the context of 
the relative paucity of provision for later 
life in the UK. The basic state pension 
(BSP) has always been low in relation to 
earnings (now only 16 per cent of average 
earnings or 31 per cent if the Second 
Pension is included, compared with 51 
per cent in France, 62 per cent in Sweden 
and 82 per cent in the Netherlands) with 
successive governments choosing to 
make poor pensioners rely on means-
tested supplements to the universal BSP. 
Take-up of these selective benefits has 
never approached 100 per cent despite 
concerted efforts to raise awareness – it 
stands currently at a maximum of 70 per 
cent for Pension Credit. Not surprisingly 
older people
alan walKer, universiTy oF sheFField
22 In Defence of Welfare: The Impacts of the Spending Review
Implicationations for Specific Group and Polices
2012 the prices measure used for pension 
uprating will be the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) rather than the currently used Retail 
Price Index (RPI). The CPI is usually lower 
than the RPI so this can be interpreted as 
a cost-cutting measure. The Government 
claims that the CPI represents low income 
groups’ expenditure better than the RPI 
but there is no convincing evidence to 
support this claim and, according to the 
IFS (2010), it is the RPI that provides the 
‘superior’ coverage of goods and services. 
Also, from April 2011, the State Second 
Pension, SERPS and/or Graduated Pension 
will be uprated in line with the CPI rather 
than the RPI, a difference of 1.5 per cent. 
This seems like a small difference but the 
majority of Britain’s pensioners live on 
relatively low incomes and the losses are 
cumulative. So the BSP is over £30 lower 
(for a single pensioner) per week than it 
would have been if the earnings link had 
not been broken in 1980. Finally with 
regard to social security, the means-tested 
Pension Credit Guarantee will be uprated 
by the cash increase in the BSP rather than 
as a percentage of earnings or the RPI.
As part of the CSR it was announced 
that state pension ages will be equalised 
by November 2018, 2 years earlier than 
planned. The pension age for both men 
and women will then be increased to 66 
by April 2020. This will affect around 5.1 
million people and the vast majority of 
losers will be women. For example a woman 
born on 5 April 1953 could claim her state 
pension a month before her 63rd birthday, 
whereas one born a year later would have 
to wait until she was 66. The Treasury 
estimates that this change will save some 
£30 billion in reduced pension payments 
and raise £13 billion from increased tax 
and NI contributions.  Also this is clearly 
not the last word by the Government on 
state pension ages.
SOCIAL CARE
The context for a consideration of the 
impact of the CSR on social care for older 
people is, first, that between 1998/9 and 
2008/9 there was a 54 per cent increase 
in spending on Adult Social Care (which 
is mainly for older people). Despite this 
increase, secondly, there is a considerable 
‘care gap’ between what is needed and 
provided. It is estimated that, in England, 
depends on how the public expenditure 
cuts are distributed by local authorities. 
TAXES AND BENEFITS/PENSIONS
On the fiscal and social security front, 
low income groups and pensioners were 
protected, in relative terms, by the reforms 
announced by the previous government 
before it left office, while richer groups, 
such as single earner couples and single 
people in work, had the heaviest burden 
as a proportion of income. As the IFS 
demonstrates, the measures in the June 
Budget, however, disproportionately affect 
those groups that are the most reliant 
on social security, especially the single, 
unemployed, lone parents, and couples 
with no earnings (Brown and Levell, 
2010b). Pensioners are the least heavily 
hit but still suffer a net loss of just under 
3 per cent of their incomes from 2010–14. 
Of course, there are affluent as well as 
poor older people but only 16 per cent of 
pensioner couples and 7 per cent of single 
pensioners are in the top one-fifth of the 
income distribution while 44 per cent and 
58 per cent respectively are in the bottom 
two-fifths. Therefore the majority of 
pensioners, as well as other groups reliant 
on benefits or pensions, will lose as a result 
of the Coalition Government’s reforms.
Some of the very poorest older people will 
be hit hard by the benefit reforms. Among 
the poorest and most socially excluded 
in old age are those living in the private 
rented sector (Barnes, et al., 2006). The 
cuts in Housing Benefit mean that 80,000 
or so older people receiving Local Housing 
Allowance will lose an average of £12 per 
week nationally and, in London, in excess 
of £30 per week. Many of this group are 
already struggling with their housing 
costs and have no realistic prospect of 
renegotiating their rent levels or moving 
to cheaper accommodation. 
On a positive note the Coalition 
Government has restored the uprating link 
between the BSP and average earnings – a 
change campaigned for by the pensioners 
movement ever since its de-coupling in 
1980. From April 2011 the BSP is due to 
rise in line with the higher of either average 
earnings, prices or 2.5 per cent. Prices 
have risen faster than average earnings so 
the BSP will rise by 4.6 per cent in April. 
There is a sting in the tail though: from 
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then only in 4 years time. The absence 
of ring-fencing for this protection looks 
like tacit admission of the impossibility of 
this task. As this point while we cannot 
know what the eventual impact will be on 
older people in need of care it is possible 
to model likely outcomes. For example, 
even a small real term reduction of just 
over 6.5 per cent per year from 2010/11 
results in a 22 per cent budget reduction 
by 2012/13 because of the need to raise 
funding by 3.5 per cent per annum just to 
stand still (Forder and Fernández, 2010). 
This level of budget cut would result in 
the further exclusion of around 170,000 
of those with high needs from full support 
and a reduction in all recipients of state 
support by around 490,000. As a corollary 
to these reductions, self-payments by 
older people would rise.
In conclusion the impact of the tax and 
benefit reforms on older people is negative 
but, apart from some groups such as those 
in the private rented sector, modestly so 
compared with other less favoured benefit 
recipients. In the social care field the 
impact looks likely to be severe. Equally 
importantly the Government’s cuts 
agenda appears to veto any progressive 
social policy advances in the form of 
either a reduction in pensioner poverty or 
a narrowing of the social care gap.
there are 1.4 million older people with 
low level care needs and 0.9 million with 
high needs. The majority (5.5 million) do 
not require care. But only three out of 
five of those with high needs receive any 
formal support either in their own homes 
or in residential care/nursing homes. 
Also there was a decline of some 70,000 
receiving support in their own homes, 
2000 to 2009, as eligibility criteria were 
tightened.
The starting point on social care then is, on 
the one hand, substantial under-provision 
at the high end of need and, on the 
other, virtually nothing of a preventative 
nature at the lower end. Also, because 
of population ageing and increases in the 
cost of care, just to maintain the current 
level of access to public support requires 
a real term increase of 3.5 per cent per 
annum. The CSR announced ‘protection’ 
for Adult Social Care in the form of £1 
billion by 2014/15 plus a further £1 billion 
to be provided by the NHS through joint 
working with councils. This ‘protection’ 
therefore relies, on the one hand, on 
money being transferred from the NHS 
which itself is facing the tightest financial 
constraints for 30 years and, on the other, 
on local authorities being able to allocate 
sufficient resources when their funding 
is being reduced by 26 per cent, and 
DUCKING THE NEET ISSUE
In July 2010, the Audit Commission 
published a thorough and comprehensive 
examination of one of the most intractable 
problems facing youth policy in the UK in 
recent decades, young people who reach 
minimum school leaving age and drop out 
of all forms of education, employment and 
training (NEET) (Audit Commission, 2010). 
The numbers who were NEET had reached 
208,196 by 2008, some 10.3 per cent of 
the age group. 
One of the first acts of the Coalition Government on its first day in office was to abolish the Department of 
Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) 
and replace it with a Department for 
Education. This signalled a return to a 
department concerned with organisations 
and institutions (schools and colleges) 
rather than focused on serving the needs 
of a particular client group, children, young 
people and their families. It also cost a lot 
of money.
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in 2004. These were intended to increase 
participation rates in post-16 education, 
especially amongst the children of 
poor families whose participation rates 
were particularly low. EMAs rewarded 
attendance with payments of between 
£30-£40 per week. The full rates were paid 
to poor families - families with an annual 
income of £13,000 per year or less - with 
lower allowances to families earning up 
to £30,000 per year. These are set to be 
withdrawn following the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR), with the budget 
for supporting the children from poor 
families virtually eliminated. Head teachers 
and college principals are outraged as 
they will be left with the impossible task 
of adjudicating who amongst the poor can 
be supported by a hardship fund which is 
now woefully inadequate to meet students’ 
needs. They fear participation rates will 
dip once more and the numbers NEET will 
inevitably rise. 
The success of EMAs in meeting policy goals 
is impressive, resulting in significantly 
increased participation, retention and 
achievement. Participation of 16 year olds 
was shown to have increased by 5.9 per 
cent and amongst the most difficult group 
(boys living in urban areas) by 6.9 per 
cent. The largest impact was on young 
people living in families in socio-economic 
groups 4 and 5 (semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers), where increases of 9.1 per cent 
were recorded.
The national evaluation of EMAs concluded 
that they had a disproportionate, positive, 
impact upon the destinations of specific 
target groups who tended to be under-
represented in post-16 education, namely, 
young people from lower income families 
and young men (Middleton et al., 2005).  
FUTURE JOBS FUND AND YOUNG 
PERSONS GUARANTEE 
Earlier in May 2010, the Government had 
announced the withdrawal of important 
support for the older age group. The 
Young Persons Guarantee and Future 
Jobs Fund were first announced in the 
2009 Budget and were targeted at 18-25 
year olds who had been unemployed for 
over six months. The Future Jobs Fund 
(a key part of the Guarantee) was a job 
creation measure aimed at helping the 
Part of the review undertaken by the Audit 
Commission was to attempt to estimate 
the life-time cost to the public finances. 
This revealed that this cost had risen from 
£8.7 billion in 2002 to just short of £12 
billion in 2008 (Coles et al., 2010).
Research undertaken for the Audit 
Commission also helped to identify sub-
groups within the NEET group who proved 
especially expensive to public expenditure. 
It calculated that failure to identify and 
support children with special educational 
needs could result in a life time cost to 
public expenditure of £575,000 for each 
child. In the case of a young offender, the 
life-time public finance savings from a 
programme of support, which resulted in 
desisting from future offending, compared 
to a young offender who went on to be a 
persistent offender, exceeded £2 million 
for a single case. 
The research also highlighted very 
significant public finance savings to be 
made by relatively modest investment in 
effective support for care leavers, young 
carers, teen mothers, young offenders 
and young people with disabilities. What 
are sometimes naively regarded as cuts of 
luxuries we cannot afford can, and should, 
be seen as investments that will result in 
long term savings to public expenditure.
However, support for groups of vulnerable 
young people has now been put at risk by 
reductions in central government support 
for local authorities. Many of the modestly 
funded young support programmes 
identified by the Audit Commission (2010) 
cost only a few thousand pounds. The 
research also illustrated how, although 
these are currently funded by local 
authorities, the longer term costs which 
will accrue if such programmes are cut 
will be borne by central government. 
This is because of future losses to tax 
and National Insurance revenues, benefit 
payments, and the costs to the National 
Health Service and Ministry of Justice. 
EDUCATIONAL MAINTENANCE 
ALLOWANCE
Educational Maintenance Allowances 
(EMAs) were initially piloted in 15 areas of 
the UK before being rolled out nationally 
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in public expenditure increases in the 
future. Some public expenditure must 
be seen as cost-effective investment. On 
NEET, cuts in youth support are likely to 
increase the £12 billion life-time cost of 
NEET very significantly. Scrapping the 
EMA will increase the numbers NEET as 
well as causing short term hardship for 
poor families who cannot afford post-
16 education. Ceasing to invest in the 
Future Jobs fund will push up youth 
unemployment and the cost that brings 
through benefits. 
most vulnerable young people to escape 
the impact of recession. It used up to 
£1billion in 2009-2010 to support more 
than 100,000 young people into new jobs 
paying at least national minimum wage 
(Haymann, 2009). 
WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE? 
The Coalition Government in its rush 
to cut public expenditure has failed 
to distinguish between cuts that can 
save money and cuts which will result 
on the 5 million claimants is very hard to 
gauge in the absence of detailed proposals. 
The benefit withdrawal rate is all important 
here with initial details suggesting a 
benefits withdrawal of 65/100 as opposed 
to the current 75/100. However as has 
been noted by IPPR (2010) job creation and 
support is not receiving the same degree of 
attention as welfare reform. 
WORK PROGRAMME
Of note, the Government is planning to 
scrap the current complex array of work 
programmes for disabled people - for 
example New Deal, Work Step, and Work 
Preparation. It intends to introduce a single 
Work Programme for all out of work benefit 
claimants. Although the detail is limited, 
it appears some disabled people closer to 
the labour market will be supported via 
this single gateway of support. For disabled 
people with more obvious support needs a 
Work Choice programme is being introduced 
to provide intensive support. The details 
provided on intensive support suggest 
CV writing, brokerage and closer working 
with employers will form the main support 
activities. In truth, these forms of support 
were available under previous schemes, 
whilst the more hands-on approach to 
employers seems at odds with the proposed 
Disabled people have largely been protected from major welfare retractions during periods of fiscal 
crisis. This stance has recently changed 
dramatically. Key targets for policy 
reform are those disabled people claiming 
Employment Support Allowance (ESA), 
formerly Incapacity Benefit (IB). More 
differentiated approaches have already 
been introduced to establish those disabled 
people too sick/disabled to work, those 
that should move rapidly into work or 
mainstream jobseekers allowance and a 
review group who will face continual Work 
Capability Assessment; it is assumed many 
will be moved off ESA where work capability 
is in evidence. Those ESA recipients deemed 
closest to the labour market and allocated 
to the Work Related Activity Group will have 
their claim limited to one year. The key 
benefits that make work possible for those 
on low incomes are also being reappraised. 
Housing benefit will be capped at a modest 
level. This will likely impact negatively 
on those disabled people in high housing 
cost areas. Any tightening of eligibility for 
new housing benefit claimants will impact 
disproportionately on disabled people 
contemplating entry to lower paid work. 
The Coalition Government is to introduce 
a universal credit that aims to incentivise 
greater access to work and hours build-up. 
The exact impact of the universal credit 
disaBled people
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commitments are welcomed by some 
disability organizations, but the timetable, 
in taking the commitments to 2014/15, has 
prompted concerns that actual uplifts in 
2011/12 will not be anything approaching 
this sum. This news comes in the wake 
of major reviews on the funding in this 
area - the Wanless Review (2006) and 
the Sutherland Review (2008). An ageing 
population, personalization and user led 
organizations (ULOs) of course are all 
premised on further budgetary investment. 
Arguably however, these extra monies, if 
they materialize, will do little to ameliorate 
already severely strained budgets for adult 
social support. Many ULOs and Centres for 
Integrated/Inclusive Living (CILs) are under 
threat and many local authorities are now 
restricting their funding to the top category 
of eligibility. It seems reasonable to assume 
that, given wider local authority budget 
cuts and the reliance for up to half the new 
monies coming from health budgets, adult 
social care funding is likely to be extremely 
limited in the next 2 years. The figure of 
circa 500,000 fewer jobs in the public sector 
is unlikely to leave social care funding 
unscathed. New developments sit alongside 
withdrawn services - the Independent 
Living Fund (ILF), a fund providing funding 
for the most complex needs, will no longer 
be taking new applicants as the scheme is 
gradually withdrawn. 
The Coalition aims to end the Child Trust Fund 
for disabled children and will likely redirect 
funding to direct payments for children and 
carers to provide greater respite care and 
hospice provision, with an extra £10 million 
per annum from 2011. Whilst welcome, 
these are essentially funded relief to prevent 
physical deterioration; the funding makes 
no connection to positive empowering 
life choices. The loss of Disability Living 
Allowance (DLA), housing benefit and ESA 
for some working age disabled people will 
likely perpetuate the link between having 
a disabled adult in a household and child 
poverty where suitable paid work is not 
available. The Government’s statements on 
education are arguably the most worrying 
aspect of their proposed reforms. With 
little evidence to back up their assertions, 
the Coalition Government has stated: ‘We 
will improve diagnostic assessment for 
schoolchildren, prevent the unnecessary 
closure of special schools and remove the 
bias towards inclusion’ (Cabinet Office, 
review of disability discrimination legislation 
which may be viewed as reducing the power 
of ADL (Anti-Discrimination Legislation) in 
the disability field. No figures are available 
for the savings from an additional entry 
of large numbers of disabled people into 
paid work (although benefit savings will be 
evident where someone enters work, there 
will be additional costs where extra hours 
are worked and withdrawal rates are made 
to benefit the claimant). 
The key assertion that benefits are more 
attractive than paid work because of 
disincentives in the benefits system is 
borne out by some evidence (OECD, 
2003). However this report also failed 
to find one key programme or approach 
across OECD countries that substantially 
improved disabled people’s path to paid 
work. The Government does however plan 
to increase tax allowances for low income 
earners from April 2011 which may benefit 
some disabled people. Also helpful may 
be the reforming of Access to Work, a key 
workplace support fund to allow funding 
before a job is secured so that a disabled 
person can enter employment with support 
in place. The exact role of employer’s 
financial contribution, a current feature of 
the scheme, is unclear at this point. Local 
labour market conditions are closely linked 
to rates of ‘out of work’ disability benefit 
recipients; research (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2003) points to the absence of job 
opportunities, benefit traps and also cycles 
of worklessness all being important. Harsher 
welfare regimes in the absence of greater 
employment opportunities may simply lead 
to movement on to less generous benefits, 
an important policy consideration where 
genuine extra costs are no longer met. 
Evidence from the mainstream jobseekers 
allowance population of churning, repeat 
entry and exit to the jobs market suggests 
that sustained employment for some 
disabled people leaving ESA may be limited. 
FUNDING COMMITMENTS
For those with the highest levels of social 
support needs the news that around £2 
billion is being made available to support 
adult social care by 2014/15 is welcomed. 
The Disabled Facilities Grant, a means 
tested fund supporting accessible homes, 
is being increased from £169 million in 
2010/11 to £185 million in 2014/15. These 
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that the revised Work Programme and 
Work Choice programme will provide the 
sustained and tailored support that proved 
successful in say the intensive Workstep 
programme for disabled people. However 
both programmes only plan to support 
those able to work 16 plus hours, and do 
not incentivise hours build-up below that 
figure. The mooting of a more ‘realistic’ 
operation of disability discrimination 
legislation can be read as an attempt 
to water down its legislative ‘burden’. 
The available evidence suggests a more 
demanding operation of the legislation 
is required to support the reciprocal 
relationship between disabled jobseeker 
and welcoming employer. 
Of all the proposed reforms adult social 
care may prove to be the most contested 
policy area. The raised expectations of 
personalisation, alongside an ageing 
population demands significant investments 
into the second decade of the 21st century 
to support user-led innovations. The 
review of all DLA and ESA claimants will 
be a very expensive process, and on 
current evidence, reviews will lead to 
many successful appeals. For many, DLA 
makes the difference between significant 
poverty and managing some additional 
disability-related costs. The loss of DLA 
may simply see more people applying for 
tax and pension credits. The loss of the 
DLA higher rate mobility component may 
cause disproportionate hardship where the 
Motability scheme is being used to fund a 
car from DLA. Mid-award withdrawal of DLA 
would threaten the functioning of arguably 
the most successful disability mobility 
scheme globally, one which sees 6 per cent 
of new car sales in the UK funded via DLA 
and Motability. The economic multipliers 
of disabled people often tend to get lost 
in evaluations based on the ‘burden’ of 
disability costs. A more effective and 
affordable approach is to undertake a six 
yearly review for all higher rate claimants 
based on independent medical evidence and 
aligned to DLA awards. The abrupt volte-
face on educational inclusion goes against 
a burgeoning evidence base on the cultural 
and economic value of mainstreamed 
education. Evidence-based policy has 
been the mantra of the last 15 years. The 
sidelining of the considerable evidence on 
what works in disability policy may simply 
store up problems for the future. 
2010: 29). What is meant by removing the 
bias towards inclusion’ is entirely unclear - 
how inclusion, a key plank of child policy for 
13 years, can now be viewed as a bad thing 
begs major questions on the underlying 
philosophical changes in some parts of the 
Coalition.  
JAM TOMORROW
Overall the emergency budget of May 
2010 and CSR outcomes in November 
present some positive developments for 
disabled people. However the pledge of 
increased spending by 2014/15 seems to 
offer ‘jam tomorrow’ for many disabled 
adults. The ability to fund these uplifts 
seems heavily dependent upon reduced 
benefit payments given the wider fiscal 
squeeze on spending to 2015. This is a 
major gamble with the public finances. The 
ability to encourage more disabled people 
into paid work whilst respecting their 
human rights to good treatment and not 
being forced to take poverty level benefits 
is a very real one. Critics have tended 
to view the rhetoric of the ending of the 
tragic waste of disabled worklessness as 
simply a smokescreen to save money and 
redefine the disability category regardless 
of the altered economic position of those 
moved out of the more generous disability 
benefits. The proposed cuts in health 
and social care risk reversing hard won 
debates around personalised and enabling 
packages in the form of direct payments 
and personal budgets. 
A critical longer-term perspective on 
disability policy might question some of 
the arguably populist strands of Coalition 
thinking and provide an alternative policy 
agenda. Firstly, the evidence firmly points 
to the need to link work programmes 
to greater economic opportunities. The 
discussion of unfilled vacancies for which 
disabled people might apply ignores the 
geographical mismatch of opportunity 
and geographical location of disabled 
people. The Coalition’s suggestion of 
encouraging greater mobility to match 
person and opportunity ignores the cost 
of relocation, something likely to be 
made worse by the capping of housing 
benefit in high cost areas. Informal care 
networks would also likely suffer in forced 
relocations with an increased necessity to 
access funded formal care.  It is hoped 
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to accurately measure fitness for work 
(Citizens Advice, 2010). Consequently, 
around two thirds of disabled people 
assessed are found fit for work and moved 
to the stricter, less supportive Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) (DWP, 2010c). Reports 
from Citizens Advice Bureau clients reveal 
that those found supposedly fit for work 
include people suffering from cancer who 
require the use of colostomies and stoma 
bags. Some people found fit for work, 
and so ineligible for ESA, are then too ill 
or unable to sign on to JSA, and so slip 
through the gap between ESA and JSA 
eligibility, ending up without any support 
at all. 
ESA is the most appealed benefit in the 
UK. Some 8,000 cases are brought to 
tribunal every month; 40 per cent are 
overturned in the appellant’s favour (Daily 
Mail, 2010). Such tribunals come at great 
stress to the claimant and significant cost 
to the taxpayer, and appeals will no doubt 
increase when DLA reassessments using 
this test are rolled out nationally. So too 
will the rate at which such assessments are 
overturned, which will inevitably reduce 
any actual savings the Government aimed 
to make.
Moreover, and perhaps more important, 
DLA is premised upon the social model of 
disability – in fact, it is the only benefit that 
is – which takes into account the personal, 
practical and social barriers that effectively 
‘disable’ an individual with an impairment. 
The WCA, however, described as ‘a clunky 
and insensitive medical assessment’, takes 
little account of these additional barriers 
and costs (Disability Now, 2010; Citizens 
Advice, 2010), which makes it wholly 
inappropriate for DLA reassessments. 
Eligibility for DLA should aim to measure the 
practical and social difficulties a disabled 
person faces, and calculate the costs of 
these barriers accordingly. Establishing 
a medical diagnosis and measuring the 
functional impact of impairment via the 
WCA will only ever present part of an 
otherwise complex picture. 
In his speech ‘Welfare for the 21st Century’ last May, Iain Duncan Smith said: ‘we have to constantly remind 
ourselves that we are here to help the 
poorest and most vulnerable in our 
society’, and achieve the right balance 
between risk and reward (Duncan Smith, 
2010). For disabled people, however, the 
Government’s recent plethora of fiscal and 
welfare reforms seem set to do neither.  
DISABILITY LIVING ALLOWANCE (DLA)
DLA is a tax-free, non-means-tested 
allowance designed to help cover the extra 
costs of living with a disability. Such costs 
can be prohibitively high: analysis shows 
that when these are accounted for, the 
proportion of households with a disabled 
member living in poverty doubles (Sen, 
2009). DLA allows recipients to meet vital 
expenses like the cost of personal care and 
medical equipment. Many have said that 
without it they would be unable to pay bills 
or get the healthcare they need (Corden et 
al., 2010). 
However, DLA is soon set to undergo 
radical change. In his Budget speech, the 
Chancellor announced the introduction of a 
new ‘medical assessment’ for all new and 
existing claimants and revised eligibility 
criterion – both aimed at reducing DLA 
caseload and expenditure by a fifth, 
supposedly saving over £1 billion (Osborne 
in Onangua, 2010). (Note: in December 
2010, the government announced DLA 
would be replaced completely with the 
Personal Independence Payment (PIP)). 
There are real issues here with this plan 
– namely its accompanying estimations, 
assumptions and narrative. The new 
medical test for DLA is to be closely modelled 
on the Work Capability Assessment (WCA), 
which is so contentious it is under both 
government and independent review. 
The WCA is a medical test, currently 
used to assess eligibility for Employment 
and Support Allowance (ESA). And 
yet, analyses show it frequently fails 
disaBiliTy BeneFiTs
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Finally, for many disabled people who are 
in employment, disability discrimination 
is still all too common: over half have 
experienced discrimination while at work 
(Gore and Parckar, 2009). However, should 
an affected individual then be judged 
to have left their job voluntarily, they 
may then be subject to further benefit 
sanctions, leaving them even worse off 
than before. Ultimately, for disabled people, 
the suitability of JSA – its conditionality 
and sanctions regime – remains highly 
questionable. 
ALTERNATIVES
Disability benefits remain an emotive 
and highly controversial area of welfare 
policy; attempts to reconfigure them 
are almost certain to provoke outcry. 
The Government’s attempt to reform 
disability benefits is bold but misguided. 
We do not suggest, nor do we believe, 
that disabled people should be exempt 
from such reforms, but the gravity of the 
unintended consequences that could arise 
– a rise in social and financial exclusion, 
an increase in ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycles of 
employment and the further entrenchment 
of benefits dependency – is indeed serious. 
In the instance of DLA, we recommend 
exploring and developing a co-produced, 
personalised assessment, which properly 
measures the social and practical barriers 
a disabled person faces and the costs of 
overcoming them. In terms of welfare-to-
work reform, we advocate reforming the 
WCA for ESA claimants (and those who will 
go onto the incapacity component of the 
forthcoming universal credit) to make it a 
holistic, personalised test that assesses a 
range of capabilities and identifies physical, 
psychological, social and practical barriers 
to work. Furthermore, we believe there 
should be established a ‘work ready’ ESA 
group for those IB claimants found fit for 
work, as opposed to moving them onto 
JSA. This group would claim the same level 
of benefit as JSA but – in recognition of 
the practical and social barriers disabled 
people face when seeking employment 
– would not be subject to the same 
conditions and penalty regimes. Rather, 
they would have access to a personalised 
support regime which would better enable 
them to move towards re-enablement and 
secure and sustain appropriate, meaningful 
employment.
Then there is the worrying trend of 
misrepresenting DLA as an out-of-work 
benefit. In his Budget speech, the Chancellor 
claimed that reassessing recipients would 
improve ‘incentives to work’. Elsewhere, 
the Budget 2010 document explicitly 
suggests reforming disability benefits will 
‘reduce dependency and promote work’. 
However, such depictions are highly 
misleading; recipients can work and claim 
simultaneously. DWP research shows DLA 
enables recipients to meet key expenses 
like healthcare and transport; parents of 
child recipients use it to cover costs like 
physiotherapy, extra tuition, and speech 
and language therapy (Corden et al., 2010). 
INCAPACITY BENEFIT (IB)
Plans to reassess Incapacity Benefit 
recipients are expected to save around 
£1.5 billion and result in some 23 per 
cent of claimants being moved to JSA 
(BBC News, 2010a; Work and Pensions 
Select Committee, 2010). Claimants are 
to be tested using the WCA – many of its 
shortcomings have been outlined above. 
As aforementioned, appeals for ESA are 
high and will almost certainly increase 
as reassessments for IB are rolled out. 
Academics like Paul Gregg – one of the 
architects of the ESA system – rightly point 
out that incorrectly assessing individuals 
as fit for work could end up costing the 
Government more money rather than 
saving it (Daily Mail, 2010). 
IB was never likely to have been excluded 
from the Government’s welfare reforms, 
nor should it have been. However, many 
disabled people passed on to JSA will be 
at a distinct disadvantage when trying to 
comply with its conditions. Some will be 
unable to take up offers of work because 
these are unsuitable to their needs. 
Surveys of disabled people in pursuit of 
work show almost half have had to restrict 
their choice of jobs because of inaccessible 
transport; a quarter had to refuse a job 
offer for the same reason; almost another 
quarter had to decline a job interview (Gore 
and Parckar, 2010). Mindful of this, the 
Government’s new JSA sanctions regime 
is likely to leave many disabled people 
at risk of having their benefits reduced 
should they have to decline – for perfectly 
valid, disability-related reasons – the offer 
of what may well be inappropriate work. 
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and increase flexibility for local authorities’ 
(HM Treasury, 2010a: 44), the £1 
billion additional grant will come to local 
authorities as part of the local government 
formula grant (that is, it will not be ring-
fenced). Given that local government 
budgets will be reduced by 26 per cent, 
there is a risk that social care receives 
extra funding on paper, but that this is 
immediately swallowed up in a massive 
programme of broader local government 
cuts. Whether this is appropriate local 
discretion in an era of localism, or clever 
political cover when the full implications 
of the cuts become apparent, probably 
depends on your point of view. According 
to one media commentator, one 
interpretation of the Spending Review is 
that the Government has simply handed 
the axe to local government. Of course, 
this is nothing new as a political tactic, and 
similar approaches to the local government 
grant have also been common in the past. 
Indeed, the local government budget has 
sometimes been described in terms of the 
‘tardis effect’ – if anyone added up all the 
cost pressures and spending predictions 
that ministers said had already been 
allowed for, the grant would be bigger on 
the inside than on the outside.
In recognition of some of this, the 
Government has acknowledged that 
significant reforms and efficiency savings 
will be needed. However, whether this will 
be enough to balance massive reductions 
in the local government budget, rising 
need and pressures within the NHS 
seems unlikely. According to the Local 
Government Association (2010), one 
means of managing demand in adult 
social care is to tighten eligibility criteria, 
with more councils likely to restrict access 
to support to people assessed as having 
‘critical’ needs – although this would only 
be a last resort and there may be other 
ways of seeking additional efficiencies first. 
If this came to pass, it would mean an even 
greater focus on people already in crisis 
and undermine a series of other policies 
designed to rebalance the system towards 
At face value, the 2010 Spending Review looks like an unexpected victory for adult social care. In the 
past there has been concern that adult 
social care is under-funded relative to 
other areas of the welfare state. Low 
status and poorly understood, it has also 
had to find ways of responding to a series 
of demographic, social, technological and 
cultural changes. As a result, there have 
been previous reviews (Royal Commission 
on Long-Term Care, 1999; Wanless, 
2006), with a more recent national ‘Big 
Care Debate’ (HM Government, 2008) a 
Green Paper (HM Government, 2009) and 
a White Paper (HM Government, 2010). 
As a result of all this, adult social care 
went into the Spending Review with a clear 
argument.  With no further action, costs 
would double within twenty years, and 
there was clear evidence to demonstrate 
the need for additional funding on the one 
hand and for more fundamental reform on 
the other. Arising out of this, the Spending 
Review announced:
•   An increase by £1 billion in real terms 
in the Personal Social Services Grant 
to local authorities by 2014-15.
•   An additional £1 billion by 2014-15 set 
aside from the NHS to support further 
health and social care integration and 
invest in re-ablement services.
•   In time, there will be two new 
grants (to reflect the continued 
transfer of responsibility for learning 
disability services from the NHS to 
local government and to support 
the transfer of public health to local 
government).
DEVIL IN THE DETAIL
At first glance, it seems that the argument 
for extra investment has been won – and 
credit should go to social care leaders 
within the Department of Health and 
elsewhere for building such a strong 
case. However, this is only the part of 
the story – and the devil is often in the 
detail. ‘To reduce administrative burdens 
adulT social care
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this would be the case for current services 
(which have already been strongly criticised 
for failing to fully and appropriately meet 
need). Under our ‘solid progress’ scenario, 
the overall costs of the system would 
continue to rise, albeit rather more slowly 
than for the ‘slow uptake’ scenario. Given 
current financial, demographic and social 
pressures, it is imperative that policy for 
adult social care aims for the sustained 
commitment to change that gives the 
best chance to deliver the ‘fully engaged’ 
scenario. If this scenario were to be fully 
achieved (and this requires meeting a very 
demanding series of assumptions), our 
analysis suggests that we may see costs of 
adult social care contained at close to their 
current level.  
In addition to the impact on social care 
spending, our review argued that social 
care reform/investment also has the 
potential to reduce spending in other areas 
(Glasby et al., 2010):
•   It may be possible to save £1 on 
emergency beds days for every £1 
spent on prevention (‘solid progress’) 
and £1.20 saved for every £1 spent 
(‘fully engaged’).
•   If some of the gains from high 
performing integrated sites could be 
achieved more generally, there may 
be scope to achieve 2.7 million fewer 
hospital admissions among the over-
65s each year (a 22 per cent reduction 
overall).
•   Supporting social care service users 
to engage in paid employment could 
generate additional earnings of £400 
million each year (of which over 
£50 million would be paid in tax and 
National Insurance) plus a reduction 
in benefits spending of £150 million 
(‘solid progress’). This would double 
under a ‘fully engaged’ scenario. Of 
course, achieving such changes at a 
time of high job losses in the public 
sector would be very challenging.
•   Greater support for carers could lead 
to additional earnings of £750 million 
for working carers (‘solid progress’) or 
£1500 million (‘fully engaged’), with 
extra revenue gained through tax and 
National Insurance.  
Overall, the response to the Spending 
Review from within adult social care 
probably depends on your point of view: an 
a more preventative approach. Another 
possibility is that adult social care benefits 
from additional funding from a ring-fenced 
NHS, but loses out more generally as a 
result of local government cuts - a case of 
swings and roundabouts.
ALTERNATIVES
Instead of this, an alternative would be 
to more fully and directly invest in adult 
social care (perhaps ring-fencing the 
money so that it cannot be used to fill holes 
elsewhere). This might not be palatable 
with a firm commitment to localism – but 
failing to ring-fence will almost inevitably 
mean that money leaks elsewhere and 
social care suffers. What is also needed is 
a shift in mindset, so that social care is 
not seen as a ‘necessary evil’ that we can 
no longer afford in difficult financial times 
– but as a form of social and economic 
investment that improves people’s lives 
and makes substantial savings elsewhere. 
In our previous analysis of ‘the case for 
social care reform’, we identified 3 potential 
scenarios over the next 20 years (Glasby 
et al., 2010):
•   Slow uptake: future policy/practice 
remains as now. Despite a stated 
commitment to more radical change, 
the commitment to reform is often 
rhetorical rather than reality.
•   Solid progress: while the stated 
aims of policy remain similar, there 
is a much more concerted effort to 
improve outcomes and deliver savings 
through more radical change. In 
practice, the intended benefits are not 
fully realised to quite the extent that 
was envisaged and thinking retreats 
towards previous approaches.
•   Fully engaged: there is a sustained 
commitment to genuine change, 
motivated by a desire to realise in full 
the benefits for the health and social 
care system and for wider society. 
Although some of the evidence base 
is currently contested or unclear, the 
outcomes surpass expectations and 
the mechanisms of reform start to 
really deliver.  
Using our three scenarios, we conclude that 
doing nothing is not an option. On existing 
trends, the real costs of adult social care 
could double within two decades – and 
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current context is that the Local Authority 
Chief Executive might conclude that the 
glass is twice as big as it needs to be.
optimist might say the glass was half full 
or the pessimist may say it is half empty. 
Without ring-fencing, the danger in the 
BIG SOCIETY, EMERGENCY BUDGET
This has not gone unnoticed by the 
Coalition Government. Voluntary and 
community organisations, mutuals and 
social enterprises have been widely lauded 
by Ministers and afforded a central place in 
the Big Society, a loose collection of policy 
ideas that imply a shift in responsibility 
away from the state towards the individual 
in a rebalancing of the mixed economy of 
welfare. The Big Society agenda itself has 
stimulated intense, wide-ranging debate 
over the relative roles of the state and 
voluntary organisations, not least of which 
is the public spending context within which 
such ideas must be implemented. The 2010 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), 
which sets the spending framework for the 
period 2011/12-2014/15, has therefore 
been viewed as critical to the sector’s role 
in building the Big Society. 
Needless to say, CSR was met by many 
organisations with a different level of 
expectation and response. A number of 
organisations were already dealing with 
the impact of announcements made in the 
June emergency budget: in particular, a 
reduction of £1.6 billion in the Area Based 
Grant had hit hard local authorities, with 
a number in-turn passing on ‘in year’ cuts 
to organisations they funded or contracted 
with. Our initial analysis suggests that 
northern local authorities have been 
hardest hit by the reductions in Area 
Based Grant and that a greater proportion 
of voluntary organisations are funded in 
such areas. Whilst it would be unrealistic 
to argue that the recipients of government 
grants or contracts should be immune from 
cuts in spending levels, the experience of 
Spending reviews over the last decade have generally been occasions that the voluntary and community sector 
has met with a degree of certainty and even 
optimism. A period of sustained economic 
growth has been accompanied by greater 
investment in public services. Moreover, a 
number of concurrent ‘cross-cutting’ policy 
reviews into the role of the ‘third sector’ 
identified a greater role for voluntary and 
community organisations in the design 
and provision of services. Framed by the 
Compact (an agreement highlighting 
respective roles and responsibilities) 
and investment in infrastructure, a more 
mainstream partnership with the state 
has meant voluntary and community 
organisations have often been able to 
represent the needs and views of users, 
many of whom are the most marginalised 
in our society. 
Partnership with the state has also built the 
capacity of the sector to deliver services: 
an estimated £12.8 billion of statutory 
income in 2007/08 flowed into the sector, 
much of which has been contract income 
for the delivery of services. A gradual shift 
from grants to contracts, and isomorphic 
tendencies on the part of statutory bodies, 
has however meant that smaller, grassroots 
organisations have fared less well. Whilst 
this partnership between the state and 
sector inevitably has been uneven in 
nature, the balance sheet for service users 
has been, we believe, generally positive. 
There are many examples of service 
redesign and improvement that have 
improved outcomes for users, such as 
the role of the RNID (The Royal National 
Institute for Deaf People) in modernising 
the NHS audiology service. 
volunTary and communiTy organisaTions
Karl wilding, naTional council For volunTary 
organisaTions
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see its funding reduced significantly as 
programmes are ended. In short, changes 
will create both winners and losers, with 
seemingly more of the latter.
We remain particularly concerned about the 
spending settlement likely to be received 
by local government. Indications are that a 
26 per cent, front-loaded reduction in the 
local authority settlement will be passed 
on to groups and organisations funded 
to provide services. Such a reduction is 
equivalent to removing £1.8 billion from 
the sector’s annual income, but this may 
turn out to be an underestimate. Moreover, 
many voluntary organisations are 
concerned that the removal of ring-fencing 
from local authorities’ central allocation, a 
nod to the localism strand of Big Society, 
will lead to substantive variation in levels 
of service provision and the prioritisation 
of communities of place over communities 
of interest. Anecdotal evidence from 
the National Council for Voluntary 
Organisation’s Compact Advocacy project 
– and indeed comments from the Minister 
for Civil Society - suggests that voluntary 
organisations will fare badly from local 
authorities’ admittedly difficult challenge 
of reducing spending.
The CSR made a number of sector-
specific announcements, the centrepiece 
of which was a £470 million package of 
support and capacity building funds. 
This includes funding for a pilot of the 
National Citizen Service, ‘community 
first’ funding (which replaces grassroots 
grants), and a £100 million transition 
fund to assist organisations delivering 
public services. There is also commitment 
to establish a ‘Big Society Bank’, which 
will provide capital for specialist financial 
intermediaries providing new forms of 
social finance. The latter have not escaped 
criticism, particularly in relation to their 
scale.
UNCERTAIN FUTURES
Does the CSR provide a financial 
framework for the Big Society? And if 
so, does it provide a framework for the 
voluntary organisations, mutuals and 
community groups that will be expected 
to implement the ideas of Big Society, 
not to mention deal with the impact 
on communities of reductions in public 
a number of funded organisations would 
suggest that some statutory bodies 
neither understand the organisations they 
work in ‘partnership’ with nor care about 
the impact upon the communities they 
serve. One Primary Care Trust is reported 
to have told its grant recipients to return 
any money relating to the remainder of 
the financial year. Negotiating the local 
impact of national decisions is likely to be a 
recurring outcome of the CSR, particularly 
in view of another central dimension of the 
Big Society agenda, localism.
THE SPENDING REVIEW
If the announcements of the emergency 
budget were the hors d’oeuvres, then a 
main course of spending cuts may yet 
prove indigestible for many voluntary 
and community organisations. Although 
overall government spending is set to rise, 
primarily due to higher interest payments 
on debt and social security payments, a 
13 per cent reduction in departmental 
spending limits is likely to hit many parts 
of the sector, particularly those that deliver 
services. A number of commentators 
are currently suggesting that cuts might 
equate to a reduction of approximately 
£4.2 billion to the sector’s annual income 
of £12.8 billion. We believe this figure 
requires substantiation and may be an 
overestimate.
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests 
that organisations working with central 
government departments of Communities 
and Local Government, Education and 
the Home Office will be hardest hit. 
Perhaps typical is the Supporting People 
programme, which provides housing 
related support to help vulnerable people 
to live independently in the community. 
Supporting People has been cut by 12 
per cent and just as importantly the 
funding – like many other programmes 
- is no longer ring-fenced (see below). 
Conversely, increases in The Department 
for International Development (DfID) 
budget to meet the international 
target of 0.7 per cent of GDP spent on 
overseas development aid is likely to see 
significantly increased flows through UK-
based NGOs, particularly towards the 
end of the spending review period. It 
is also worth noting that the voluntary 
sector and volunteering infrastructure will 
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Voluntary and community organisations do 
not expect special treatment, or exemption 
from cuts in spending. Many are willing to 
engage in the Big Society agenda, whether 
in terms of building the engagement of 
communities or shifting from a grants-
based funding model to a loans-based 
finance model. Where it is appropriate for 
their users and beneficiaries, organisations 
are willing to work with statutory bodies 
around shared services. Nevertheless, the 
Spending Review has reinforced the view 
of many that the good initiatives identified 
under the Big Society banner will be all 
the more challenging to implement in a 
climate of cuts and uncertainty.
spending? The speed and scale of funding 
reductions initially would suggest there 
are significant challenges for this agenda. 
Much will depend upon the attitudes and 
funding practices of local authorities to 
the voluntary and community sector. A 
willingness to work in genuine partnership 
to deal with the tough fiscal climate will 
be necessary. A shift in public service 
contracts towards payment by results 
represents a significant transfer of risk that 
many will not be able to bear. Increases 
in VAT and the end of transitional relief 
in gift aid will increase costs and reduce 
income. Transitional arrangements will 
help, though not solve, some of these 
challenges.
Britain from ‘stakeholder conversations’, 
and the emergence of a civil service ‘Head 
of Theology’ charged with ‘modernising’ 
and ‘contextualising’ British Muslim 
thought. More practically, New Labour’s 
response to Islam had consular support 
for Muslim pilgrims being funded by anti-
extremism budgets, Muslim civil servants 
seeking more water taps for their prayer 
room receiving responses from the 
‘preventing extremism’ unit rather than 
HR, and all religious communities other 
than Islam being dealt with as ‘faiths’, 
while Muslims were categorised as a 
security problem in a separate Prevent 
programme, whose assessment of civic 
threat was based on Muslim head count. 
Despite John Denham’s principled efforts 
to change Labour’s approach to Muslim 
communities, on arriving in Whitehall the 
new Secretary of State for Communities 
and Local Government, Eric Pickles, 
was able to declare Prevent ‘a disaster’. 
And subject to the concerns of extreme 
security hawks in the Government, such 
as Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, Pickles 
will wash Prevent away.
Post-Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), Eric Pickles will drive a 40 per cent reduction in the cost of staffing 
of the Department of Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG). At the time 
of writing, the Department had started 
a restructuring process that required 
those at the top of the organisation to re-
apply for their jobs. This re-application 
approach would then work its way down 
the organisation, settling to a conclusion 
by the end of March 2011. While this 
re-ordering will likely give rise to the 
sadness of redundancy for many hard-
working officials it is, in public at least, 
combined with a powerful intent for the 
Conservatives to continue to ‘do God’ 
very differently than their predecessors.
From the moment that the diplomat and 
think tanker Robert Cooper gained access 
to Tony Blair’s inner circle in opposition, 
New Labour had an intensely ideological 
approach to what he called ‘pre-modern’ 
Islam. On the domestic front this was 
fulfilled by Ruth Kelly’s decision to fund 
the creation of new ‘representative’ bodies 
for ‘moderate’ Muslims, Hazel Blears’ 
exclusion of the Muslim Council of Great 
religion and FaiTh communiTies
Francis davis, young FoundaTion
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Society this looks like religious funding 
while to some Conservative advisors it 
arises more from the Church’s legal and 
‘Established’ status making it, in this 
view, the only quango to have survived 
Francis Maude’s cull of non departmental 
bodies. Meanwhile new ‘barrier busting’ 
teams within DCLG will be among those 
seeking to help local authorities to 
become ‘religiously literate’, for example 
recognising that legally an organisational 
purpose of ‘advancing religion’ can also 
mean an open intent to provide services 
without discrimination and so need not 
be a basis for exclusion from contracting 
processes.
But this will be the real challenge for a 
department such as DCLG. As more of its 
functions fade away, or are re-located to 
the local level, to what extent will it want 
to keep a specialist advice function going 
as part of the current service it provides 
for the whole of Whitehall to draw upon? 
The lessons of the Labour years would 
seem to suggest that limited use of social 
science evidence to understand religious 
communities, and the ingrained secularism 
of the civil service combined with intense 
agendas from those with external access 
to Number 10 and the most senior of 
Ministers, can lead to policy distortions 
which do profound long term harm. On 
the other side of his massive restructuring 
plan this will be one for Mr Pickles and his 
team to watch, not least if they want to ‘do 
God’ very differently and ensure that faith 
communities are part of the  ‘Big Society’ 
of the future.
LOCALISM
But for Pickles, removing religious 
communities from the centralist 
bureaucratic straight jacket of ‘cohesion’ 
and encouraging them to participate in the 
civic mainstream is also a key feature of 
his ‘localist’ agenda. A decentralising state 
needs less (expensive) national strategies 
of engagement, such as Labour’s Faith 
Communities Consultative Council, and 
consequently feels little requirement to 
invest in ‘capacity building’ to make it 
possible for smaller communities to take 
part in such meetings. Rather, through 
the Localism Bill’s  ‘rights’ to save and buy 
a civic asset, or its ‘right’ to run public 
services, the Coalition would rather see 
faith communities working together to 
address unmet social need by unlocking 
local bureaucratic waste as a new source 
of civic finance.
Indeed, in the first six months after the 
election an extraordinary amount of 
Ministerial time was invested in reaching 
out to the Christian and Jewish communities 
in particular. While this gained David 
Cameron a full endorsement of the Big 
Society from the Catholic Bishops, and two 
and a half cheers for it from the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, it is unclear how long this 
peace will last as cuts to locally-funded 
Jewish and Catholic social welfare charities 
begin to bite. Meanwhile, Mr Pickles and 
Baroness Warsi have made known their 
hope that £5 million will be taken from the 
old Prevent funding stream and applied to 
the Church of England’s inter-faith work at 
the parish level. To the National Secular 
15. Those under 35 will be expected to 
share accommodation, and finally those in 
social housing are likely to see a dramatic 
increase in rent estimated to be a ‘tripling’ 
by the National Housing Federation and 
dramatic changes to new tenancies. Social 
From April 2011, Housing Benefit payments will be capped at £400 a week for a family who occupies a 
house with up to 4 bedrooms and £250 a 
week for a one bedroom property as part of 
a drive to ‘save’ £2 billion a year by 2014-
housing BeneFiT 
anne BrunTon, BucKinghamshire new universiTy
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Curbing benefits in these circumstances 
will force out those living in the poorest 
housing in the most expensive areas. 
The consequences of this will be to make 
Britain into a nation of posh ghettos and 
of course areas of extreme and moderate 
poverty. As such the Coalition parties will 
be remembered as the government that 
killed social diversity and put the nail in the 
coffin of social mobility (what remained of 
it). 
In addition, we know that stratified 
communities fail to understand one 
another. This process of enforced migration 
will exacerbate these problems and those 
associated with isolated communities: 
chief amongst them fear and unhappiness. 
As we know through the work of Hanifan 
(1916), Elias (1987), Putnam (2000), 
Wilkinson with Pickett (2009), the World 
Health Organisation (2008) and numerous 
other colleagues, deep inequalities 
manifest themselves in increases in stress 
related illnesses, higher rates of physical 
illness, lower rates of achievement and 
higher rates of crime. This deleterious 
effect is experienced by the rich and the 
poor. There is the potential for social 
disorganisation and a halting of social 
progress.   
This housing policy is a very effective 
way of objectifying the poor and robbing 
them of any social worth. Moreover, the 
failure to enact Harman’s law, which would 
prevent policy changes falling heavier on 
one class rather than another, shows clear 
commitment to this course of policy and 
a lack of any countervailing measures to 
inhibit this process.  
Additional impacts will be felt by those left 
in posh ghettos - who without the services 
of the working poor - the cleaners, waiters, 
waitresses, nannies, care assistants etc. 
- will have to pay a premium for those 
services. Those who can afford to may 
provide housing to ‘essential’ employees. 
However, it is unlikely that the ‘squeezed 
middle classes’ will be able to adopt such 
a strategy. Furthermore, the Chartered 
Institute of Housing suggests that this 
‘social cleansing’ will occur relatively 
quickly (Oliver, 2010). It is estimated that 
by 2020 almost all (13 out of 14) areas 
in London will be unaffordable to welfare 
recipients. 
housing will no longer be a home but 
merely transitional property. A home will 
now only be defined as something that is 
‘owned’.  
The potential implications of these cuts 
seem relatively clear; an end to social 
mobility, a deepening of inequality, and 
the erosion of social diversity. In particular 
these cuts will affect the very poorest be 
they employed or unemployed. Those 
claiming working tax credits will, under 
current plans, remain exempt from the cap 
– this represents a very small number of 
the working poor. 
The Government has sought to identify 
those who claim housing benefit as 
being synonymous with personal failure. 
The claiming of housing benefit is being 
characterised as shameful and those who 
do are being identified (or objectified) as 
‘scroungers’. There has been a total lack of 
any attempt to identify the complex forces 
that are at play and have led to the current 
state of affairs. These forces in the main 
being social (a shift in attitudes to both 
private and social housing), economic (the 
belief that a finite housing market can be 
the engine of an economy) and historical 
(the diminishing affordable housing 
sector); very little of this has the element 
of personal responsibility. 
However, the constant blaming of the 
individual and the call for personal 
responsibility in the past weeks in fact 
only negates personal and governmental 
responsibility. Whilst poverty is seen as a 
personal failing there will be a recurrent 
curtailment of a frank debate on housing 
and housing policy. 
CURBING BENEFITS
Without doubt it clearly rankles to pay 
money to private housing landlords. The 
process is fundamental to the current 
cost of private property and the shortage 
in affordable housing (to rent or buy). 
Government benefits help to bolster money 
hungry landlords and prop up extortionate 
rents. However, housing benefit cannot 
be capped without tackling the problem 
of unfair high rents. If you wish to have 
an unfettered private rented market 
along with a residualised social housing 
sector then you cannot curb benefits. 
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of British housing in diverse locations to 
rent at realistic amounts. This last policy 
may provide (finally) a housing market 
that is realistically priced - and would 
probably save resources in the long term. 
Indeed the ‘Pathfinder’ project was going 
some way to implement these changes 
in some of Britain’s poorest housing – a 
project that has now been axed under the 
Comprehensive Spending Review 2010. 
For the first time in quite some while, 
after the banking bail out the British public 
are now the largest owners of housing in 
Britain (through mortgaged property). 
As such it is probable that we have some 
underutilised power over these larger social 
processes for the first time in a generation. 
Clearly, some radical rethinking needs to 
occur before the current policy successfully 
cleanses British cities of social diversity.
ALTERNATIVES
To pursue a capping of housing benefit 
it would be necessary to simultaneously 
introduce a fair (a watch word of the 
current administration) rent policy – which 
applied across the private and social 
housing sector. Currently the Government 
is seeking to make social housing 
comparable to the privately rented sector 
by making it less appealing by placing 
restrictions on tenancies (maximum length 
two years) and raising rents. By doing this 
the Government will be depriving those 
who live in social housing of the right to a 
secure housing tenancy. 
Moreover there would need to be a radical 
and ambitious social housing building 
programme to rival that of post-war 
Britain. Alternatively, there could be a 
compulsory purchase of large swathes 
demand, and relying on a consumer-led 
private sector recovery represents a risky 
strategy. Ministers reading their morning 
newspapers are likely to come across 
regular and dire warnings that they are 
cutting too far and too fast, issued by Nobel 
laureate economists ranging from our own 
Christopher Pissarides to Joseph Stiglitz in 
the US. Stiglitz (2010), for example, has 
made a compelling case for continuing 
stimulus investment, citing evidence 
that ‘austerity converts downturns into 
recessions, recessions into depressions’. 
Furthermore, massive cuts to the public 
sector will inevitably accentuate the spatial 
labour market inequalities that explain why 
some depressed regions have both a higher 
proportion of public employment in the first 
place and higher rates of worklessness. 
There is little evidence that policy makers 
will seek to address such inequalities 
through well-funded, spatially-targeted 
economic development strategies – severe 
reductions in the budget for regional policy 
The Coalition Government faces a considerable challenge in tackling unemployment and worklessness 
within a context of global economic 
uncertainty and fragile recovery from 
domestic recession. While the details of a 
number of measures announced under the 
2010 Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR) and White Paper ‘Universal Credit: 
welfare that works’ remain unclear, some 
consistent themes are apparent from what 
we already know.  
NEGLECTING THE DEMAND-SIDE?
Unemployment has risen rapidly in the UK 
since the recession of 2008-09. The reasons 
for this clearly lie on the demand-side of 
the economy, with depressed demand 
in national and international markets 
eventually flowing through to reduced 
output and job losses. The rapid and 
severe cuts in public spending announced 
in the CSR may further undermine 
welFare ThaT worKs? 
colin lindsay, universiTy oF yorK
38 In Defence of Welfare: The Impacts of the Spending Review
Implicationations for Specific Group and Polices
to participate in work-related activity. 
Indeed, one of the most striking features 
of the Universal Credit White Paper is 
the description of an elaborate sanctions 
regime that proposes, among other things: 
the suspension of all benefit payments for 
as long as JSA or ESA claimants refuse 
various, defined work-related activities; 
further restrictions involving the withdrawal 
of benefits for one to twelve weeks from 
sanctioned claimants after they re-engage 
with work-related activities, presumably as 
some sort of additional punitive measure; 
and a three-year benefit suspension for JSA 
claimants refusing work-related activity on 
three occasions. These proposed changes 
represent a committed attempt to increase 
conditionality and compulsion in the state’s 
relationship with benefit claimants.
Finally, the CSR and Universal Credit White 
Paper provide relatively little detail about 
the Coalition’s plans for active labour 
market policies under the proposed ‘Work 
Programme’. What we do know is that 
virtually all Work Programme services will 
be contracted-out, with a handful of large 
providers ‘paid by results’. There is a risk 
that wholesale contracting-out will embed 
problems of ‘creaming and parking’ that 
have marred previous outsourced services 
(Hudson et al., 2010). Ministers have, to 
some extent, acknowledged this, and it 
is hoped that mooted differential funding 
models, which reward providers more for 
helping the more disadvantaged, will help 
to address creaming and parking problems 
(HoC, 2010).  
In short, the reforms attached to the CSR 
largely fail to break free of the ‘Work First’ 
approach that has come to define UK 
employment policy. It is an approach that 
assumes that worklessness is a product of 
individuals’ failings; seeks to direct people 
towards any work, irrespective of the quality 
of outcomes; and deploys restrictions on 
access to benefits and sanctions in order 
to achieve its aims. There is a substantial 
evidence base demonstrating the limitations 
of the Work First model. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Coalition Government’s policy, as 
defined in the CSR and other recent 
proposals, reflects a strong degree of 
(and the abolition of Regional Development 
Agencies) suggest that there will be an even 
greater reliance on one-size-fits-all, supply-
side labour market policies in future.
‘WORK FIRST’ WITHOUT JOBS? 
Coalition policy documents initially tended 
to identify two (and only two) ‘key problems’ 
with welfare and employment services: 
that the benefits system is too complex; 
and that it does not sufficiently incentivise 
work (DWP, 2010a). The general principle 
of proposed reforms that will simplify the 
benefits system and allow more generous 
‘disregarded’ earnings has won broad 
support and should be welcomed (DWP, 
2010b). However, at the time of writing 
there remains a lack of detail on how a 
single, universal income-based credit 
will be administered, and how health and 
other disadvantages will be evaluated and 
support allocated accordingly. 
In the more immediate term, the CSR 
introduced measures that will see 
contributions-based Employment and 
Support Allowance (ESA) limited to one 
year for the vast majority of recipients, who 
fall into the ‘work-related activity group’ 
(WRAG) of those assessed as being closer 
to the labour market. These claimants 
will then be moved onto income-based 
benefits, paid at a lower rate. As happens 
with income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA), those with savings or other sources 
of income may be excluded from benefits. 
This represents a substantial increase in 
the reach of means-testing. Combined with 
proposed restrictions on Housing Benefit 
and tax credits, there is a danger that these 
changes will increase the risk of poverty 
faced by vulnerable groups.
More generally, the focus of proposed 
reforms on individuals’ behaviour – and 
on the need for policy ‘to generate positive 
behavioural effects’ (DWP, 2010a: 10) – 
arguably reflects an analysis that places 
the blame for worklessness solely on 
individuals’ characteristics and choices. The 
logical conclusion of such an analysis is the 
need for increased compulsion on claimants. 
Accordingly, proposed reforms promise 
to demand more activity of ESA WRAG 
members by way of ‘work preparation’, while 
also suggesting strengthened sanctions for 
these and other benefit claimants failing 
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for an integrated approach to the supply-
side and demand-side of employment 
policy – high quality training and in-
work support for those further from the 
labour market; and spatially targeted 
programmes to encourage jobs growth 
in the regions and communities hardest 
hit by the recession and its aftermath. 
Work First labour market programmes 
seek to drive unemployed people into 
any job available. Such strategies tend 
to report substantial deadweight effects, 
and fail to help those most in need. Given 
the pressures on public budgets, and 
limited job opportunities in many local 
labour markets, Work First is a poor use 
of resources, and it is important that the 
Work Programme is not defined by these 
principles. Finally, moves towards benefits 
simplification are welcome, but a truly 
radical reform agenda would acknowledge 
that the low level at which payments are set 
constitutes a barrier to work in itself. As I 
have argued elsewhere, ‘we need to move 
beyond the false dichotomy of debates on 
balancing rights to “passive” benefits and 
responsibilities to participate in “active” 
employability programmes... the reality 
is that an effective benefits system that 
lifts people out of poverty while directing 
them towards support and training is in 
itself activating and empowering’ (Lindsay, 
2010: 135).
continuity with the approach adopted by its 
Labour predecessor. The new government 
appears to have retained and strengthened 
a Work First model of active labour 
market policy, defined by: increasingly 
punitive approaches to conditionality and 
compulsion; the tightening of access to 
working-age benefits; and contracted-
out services that prioritise fitting the 
workless into any job available. The Labour 
Government of 1997-2010 consistently 
failed to link active labour market policies 
to a coherent strategy on solving the 
demand-side of the employment equation 
– the relative lack of decent quality job 
opportunities in depressed regions and 
localities. This problem has not been 
solved by the Coalition. And crucially, the 
CSR’s emphasis on deficit reduction over 
continuing macro-economic stimulus, 
and specifically cuts to the public sector 
workforce, risks undermining overall 
demand, and driving up unemployment 
in relatively disadvantaged regions. There 
is a real danger that this will result in the 
greater waste of human capital that comes 
with prolonged high levels of long-term 
unemployment, and even greater risk of 
poverty and disadvantage among already 
vulnerable groups and communities.
Effective policy alternatives would need to 
address these problems. There is a need 
period, the reduction of the Department 
for Education’s administrative budget by 
a third and the ending of the Education 
Maintenance Allowance (EMA). £2.5 billion 
of the additional £3.6 billion going to 
schools has been earmarked for delivery 
of a ‘pupil premium’ (PP) to support the 
education of disadvantaged pupils. The 
remaining £1.1 billion of additional funding 
is designed to cover projected increases in 
pupil numbers. In addition, head teachers 
will be expected to ‘release’ a further £1 
billion through procurement and ‘back 
Compared to other sectors, compulsory education has fared relatively well in the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR). According to 
official pronouncements, the schools 
budget will see a 0.1 per cent real term 
increase in each year of the review period 
(amounting to £3.6 billion of additional 
spending), whilst savings in other areas will 
enable an overall reduction in education 
spending of 3 per cent by 2014/15. These 
savings include a projected 60 per cent real 
term reduction in capital spending over the 
compulsory educaTion
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working with young children who are less 
well prepared for formal school. Cuts in 
breakfast clubs and after school activities 
will negatively impact on the least well 
off young people and families who most 
depend on these services, whilst families on 
higher incomes will be able to compensate 
‘their schools’ for any losses to the budget 
through fund-raising activities. School 
sports have been significantly supported 
through School Sport Partnerships which 
have been axed as part of the CSR. Cuts 
to the arts will see fewer children visiting 
theatres and art galleries and participating 
in other arts-related activities. Hence the 
wider curriculum in many schools is likely 
to be impoverished. 
Currently LA schools work together in 
groups or ‘families’ of schools. They are 
supported by local advisors, who know their 
schools intimately, facilitate the sharing of 
best practice and support innovation. Cuts 
to LAs will result in these and other services 
to schools being threatened, including 
mental health and language support. 
Such cuts will make it harder for schools 
to offer the range of support services to 
staff, parents and pupils that help to make 
a difference in disadvantaged settings. 
Where services are deemed essential, 
schools will have to look increasingly to 
private edu-businesses and educational 
consultancies that are run for profit and 
not democratically accountable.
MARKETISATION
In parallel with the proposed cuts, 
the Government is advancing the 
marketisation agenda via the expansion 
of the academies programme and the 
introduction of new ‘free schools’ and 
‘university technical colleges’. Yet, as 
much research has demonstrated, school 
markets advantage those families best 
placed to engage with choice and diversity 
in provision and leave children who 
are socio-economically disadvantaged, 
particularly those with special needs, more 
likely to attend underfunded ‘sink’ schools. 
Especially in the context of an overall 
reduction in funding and cuts to welfare 
provisions, further marketisation is much 
more likely to widen than narrow the gap 
in educational attainment between socio-
economic groups (Lupton, 2010; Perry 
and Francis, 2010). The PP can be seen 
office’ savings. However, school budgets 
will no longer be ring-fenced which 
means dedicated funding for targeted 
initiatives such as one-to-one tuition, 
every child matters, extended schools 
and ethnic minority achievement will end. 
To reiterate, these figures are based on 
official pronouncements; the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS) calculates that in fact 
overall school funding per pupil will see a 
real term decrease of 0.6 per cent a year 
and that 60 per cent of primary and 87 
per cent of secondary school pupils are 
attending schools where spending will fall 
in real terms (Daily Telegraph, 2010).
At this stage any assessment of the impact 
of these plans must be tentative as so 
much remains uncertain. For example, 
the details of the allocation of the PP, and 
of the anticipated restructuring of special 
needs provision are yet to be announced, 
we obviously don’t yet know the spending 
plans of individual head teachers, and 
we have yet to see how the proposed 26 
per cent reduction in local authority (LA) 
funding will affect the educational support 
available to schools. 
PROTECTION
The relative protection that has been 
afforded the compulsory education 
sector is clearly to be welcomed. Also 
to be welcomed are the basic principles 
underlying these plans – to protect frontline 
services and the most disadvantaged 
pupils, cut red tape and give schools 
and head teachers greater freedom to 
determine spending priorities and innovate 
(providing that some thought is given to 
protecting the balance of provision and 
access within local areas). However, in the 
public debate surrounding the review a 
number of concerns have been aired which 
need to be taken seriously. 
Many of the proposed cuts not directly 
related to the compulsory school sector will 
have implications for schools and pupils. 
For example, library closures will reduce 
access to books, ICT facilities and places 
for children to do their homework. Benefits 
cuts will mean that some children will have 
to move home and therefore in some cases 
move schools or travel longer distances to 
school. Cuts to pre-school provision will 
mean that many primary schools will be 
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comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
ALTERNATIVES 
There are alternative cuts that could be 
made which would be less harmful. A halt to 
the introduction of free schools, university 
technical colleges, and the imposition of new 
curriculum content and synthetic phonics 
teaching would free up more cash for head 
teachers to invest in frontline services 
and to support the continuation of LA 
support services, particularly for vulnerable 
children. This would be consistent with the 
Government’s aim of freeing teachers from 
constraint so as to unleash their creative 
potential. It would also be consistent 
with the research evidence which shows 
that local innovations tend to be at least 
as effective as grand schemes of national 
change, a fact that has prompted Professor 
Margaret Brown (2010) to call for a 10 
year moratorium on central initiatives. In 
addition, we would recommend serious 
consideration be given to ending our costly 
national testing system which the Coalition 
Government is proposing to extend, 
albeit in a revised form. Research shows 
that assessment designed for large-scale 
statistical comparison of schools is ill suited 
to the promotion of learning. This does not 
rule out the use of testing for accountability 
purposes, but this could be based on light 
sampling techniques rather than on the 
state-mandated universal system currently 
in place (Gewirtz and Cribb, 2007).
as an attempt to compensate for this, 
and any effort to direct funding towards 
disadvantaged children is a positive 
development. However, according to the 
IFS (Chowdry and Sibieta, 2010), although 
the PP will be ‘broadly progressive’, under 
the proposed model the PP for schools in 
more disadvantaged areas will be smaller 
than for similarly disadvantaged schools 
in more affluent areas. Moreover, if the 
numbers of unemployed adults rise, as 
they look set to do, the funding for the 
PP as more pupils become eligible for 
this support may not be sufficient; and, 
although the PP may go towards helping 
schools to compensate children from low-
income families, there is no guarantee that 
the money will be used directly to benefit 
these pupils, the same constituency 
that is likely to be disproportionately 
disadvantaged by cuts elsewhere. 
With Michael Gove, we believe that every 
child should have access to challenging 
and exciting teaching. However, job losses, 
pay freezes and erosion to pensions, 
coupled with the introduction of yet more 
policy initiatives, may seriously erode 
teacher morale. Those teachers working to 
make a difference to the lives of children 
in settings where many of the things that 
enrich education provision will be removed 
as a consequence of wider cuts will find it 
hard to supplement these losses. 
Review (CSR) on HE is inextricably linked 
to the Browne review of HE funding 
(Independent Review of Higher Education 
Funding and Student Finance, 2010) and 
the Coalition Government’s response to it. 
Browne proposes radical reforms affecting 
the character and purpose of HE. 
The 25 per cent reduction by 2014-15 of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (BIS) resource 
budget will hit higher education (HE) most 
of all. 65 per cent of these savings will 
be delivered by reforming the funding of 
higher and further education (BIS, 2010). 
The impact of the Comprehensive Spending 
higher educaTion
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USER CHOICE
The second agenda has been the quest 
to create a market or quasi-market in 
HE. User choice and provider competition 
were central to the Labour Government’s 
reform of public services, including in HE. 
The Coalition is attempting to complete 
this unfinished agenda. Their cost-cutting 
reforms aim to increase competition 
between universities through variable 
tuition fees, and by giving students what 
is, in effect, an educational voucher in 
the form of student loans – loans akin to 
hire purchase agreements. So students 
enjoy the benefits of HE, free of charge, 
while studying, but pay for them later. 
Consequently, the bulk of universities’ 
money will follow the choices of students, 
including those of part-time students who 
for the first time will qualify for tuition fee 
loans, which is a welcome development. 
Theoretically, consumer demand will 
determine what is offered by universities. 
Students will have greater choice as new 
providers including private universities 
and Further Education (FE) Colleges enter 
the market and compete by driving up 
teaching quality and driving down price 
through efficiency gains. 
It is questionable though if choice and 
competition alone will drive up quality 
and drive down price. First, students have 
always been able to choose where to study, 
but their choices rarely follow the logic of 
economic orthodoxy and are unlikely to do 
so in the future. Secondly, all universities 
now charge the maximum tuition fee and it 
will be in their interests to do so in the future. 
They will need to charge a minimum of 
£7,000 just to recoup their lost government 
funding (IFS, 2010). Over time, it is likely 
that there will be little or no variability in 
fees. Thirdly, currently universities’ income 
for teaching depends on their success in 
recruiting students. The mechanisms now 
used for funding teaching, however, provide 
both financial stability for the sector and a 
brake on public expenditure. Both would be 
at risk in a true HE market. In reality, so 
long as the Government funds HE – be it 
through teaching grants to universities or 
financial support to students – it will have 
to control student numbers. Universities 
will not be free to enrol as many students 
as they wish, and student choice will be 
constrained. 
Following Browne’s recommendations, 
the Government is withdrawing the funds 
it gives universities for teaching most 
of its undergraduate courses but will 
continue to subsidise science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
courses at a reduced level. The lost income 
stream will be replaced by higher tuition 
fees raised from £3,290 to a maximum 
of £9,000 from 2012/13. Students will 
be able to repay their fees on graduation 
via income-contingent student loans, 
which will remain heavily subsidised by 
the Government. In future, therefore, the 
majority of arts, humanities, and social 
science courses will receive no direct 
government funding and will be financed 
purely by tuition fees.  
This means the overall HE resource 
budget, excluding research funding, will 
be cut by 40 per cent or £2.9 billion and 
reduced to £4.2 billion by 2014-15 (BIS, 
2010). However, this £4.2 billion will 
have to cover £150 million committed 
to a ‘National Scholarship Fund’, as well 
as spending on student grants (but not 
student loans). Consequently, teaching 
funds to universities will be reduced by 
about 80 per cent by 2014-15.
Wisely, the Government has maintained 
and ring-fenced the UK’s annual research 
budget of £4.6 billion a year in cash terms 
until 2014-15, representing a 9 per cent 
cut in real terms. However, it is likely that 
a greater share of research funds will be 
channelled into STEM subjects, again at 
the expense of the arts, humanities, and 
social sciences. 
The cuts facing HE form part of more 
longstanding HE policy agendas associated 
with its expansion. The first policy thrust 
has been to shift the costs of HE away 
from government and taxpayers so that 
more of them are borne by students 
and/or their parents. Underpinning this 
‘cost-sharing’ agenda (Johnstone and 
Marcucci, 2010) are the private returns 
to HE, and the notion that those who 
benefit financially from HE should pay 
for HE. Indeed, all major reforms of 
student funding introduced since 1990 
have sought to restructure the balance of 
private and public contributions to HE.
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not cost sharing; it is cost transfer and 
cost cutting on a massive scale. The 
advocates of cost-sharing always have 
argued that financial contributions from 
students should supplement and augment 
governments’ contribution to HE, and never 
replace government revenue. The way 
forward is a more equitable distribution of 
HE costs between the beneficiaries which, 
like most other countries including the US, 
acknowledges both the private and public 
returns of HE. 
Significantly, HE will remain free at the 
point of access and students will get a 
generous package of financial support. 
It is impossible, however, to know what 
impact, if any, higher fees and student loan 
debt will have on student behaviour, their 
HE choices, and their perceptions of the 
affordability of HE. Nor can we assess their 
effects on HE access and participation, 
especially for those from low-income 
backgrounds who are being asked to 
speculate financially on an imagined but 
uncertain future. 
What unites all in government and the 
HE sector is the desire for a vibrant, 
intellectually challenging, and economically 
stable HE sector. But this new, very 
different, model of HE is one that could rock 
its foundations and alter its character. It 
appears to value only the private economic 
returns of HE, rather than cherishing 
universities as centres of teaching, 
learning, and knowledge creation. Some 
would argue it is an ideological assault 
on HE, others that it will deliver a better 
deal for students, for graduates, and for 
universities. Undoubtedly, these changes 
herald a redefinition of HE and the retreat 
of the state from financial responsibility for 
it. They boost HE’s private-good functions 
at the expense of the public-good function 
and reveal a policy mind set where the 
public and private benefits of HE are a zero-
sum game. There will be short-term fiscal 
savings which are needed but will these be 
at the expense of the longer term effects 
on social equity and universities as public, 
civic, and cultural institutions? Universities 
will adapt to these changes and survive 
these cuts but for whom, and for what?
It remains to be seen if these reforms 
will reduce either public expenditure or 
public borrowing. In cash terms, public 
expenditure will increase in this Parliament 
and into the next, following the introduction 
of the new system of student support. In 
the long term, the reforms probably will 
cost more than they save (Thompson and 
Berkhradnia, 2010). Public borrowing will 
look as if it has fallen because government 
teaching grants to universities count as 
public borrowing, but loans to students do 
not. 
PUBLIC GOOD OR PRIVATE INVESTMENT?
The ideological and political ramifications of 
the reforms are just as significant as their 
economic consequences. Implicit in this 
strategy is a radical revision of the purpose 
of HE.  Up until now, HE has been seen by 
governments as a public good, articulated 
through educational and academic 
judgments, and financed mainly by public 
funds. HE’s mission has increasingly been 
aligned to the economic health and well 
being of the nation.  Consequently, HE 
has been considered as an appropriate 
investment for the state on behalf of its 
citizens, irrespective of subject discipline. 
Now large sways of HE are no longer to 
be perceived as a public good but as a 
private investment. Humanities, arts, and 
social sciences, unlike STEM subjects and 
research, apparently have no public utility. 
Yet, our political leaders have enjoyed 
and transferred the benefits of the arts, 
humanities and social sciences - only one 
member of the Cabinet studied science as 
an undergraduate and well over a quarter 
studied PPE. According to UNESCO, the 
creative and cultural industries are the 
UK’s fastest growing sector, and the UK 
is the world’s biggest single exporter of 
‘cultural goods’ (British Academy, 2010). 
Effectively, however, these non-STEM 
subjects have been privatised, putting their 
future at risk outside of elite universities. 
This is indeed radical change; one 
heretofore unthought-of, even in the 
United States. The shift of the public 
financing of institutions to the public 
funding of student support, arguably, is 
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point will be important. However while 
the UK DfID Business plan for 2011-2015 
discusses initiatives it will advance in global 
free trade and climate change mitigation, 
it is silent on global taxation policy.
SPENDING INCREASED AID
A key question becomes: what will the 
increased aid be spent on? Will it focus 
on the much needed further development 
of health, education and social protection 
services in the developing world? Here 
there are mixed messages. Certainly there 
is the much heralded initiative to increase 
spending on maternal health services and 
contraceptive provision (DfID, 2010b). Of 
the six Coalition Priorities number five is 
‘to lead international action to improve 
the lives of girls and women’ including 
the empowerment and education of girls 
because of the perceived key role of 
women in advancing development.
On the other hand there is the clearly 
articulated view of International 
Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell 
that ‘the private sector holds the key to 
tackling global poverty’ (DfID 2010c). A 
new department within DfID will be created 
consisting of private sector and economic 
expertise to work for more private 
investment in the poorest countries. ‘I 
want’, says Mitchell, ‘this department 
to be the place that lives and breaths 
the new DfID culture of private sector 
lead development’. The Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) will be 
reformed to make investments in countries 
(DfID 2010d), and consultation on CDC 
reform began on November 5th. As part of 
its wealth creation goal (Strategic Priority 
number 3 in the DfID 2011-2015 business 
plan), DfID will promote an African Free 
Trade Area and work with the G20 to agree 
duty-free access for Least Developed 
Countries. As desirable as some of these 
policies may be, it is as if the lessons of 
the twenty years of the UN Development 
Programme’s Human Development Reports 
(UH HDR), that trade and private sector 
Certainly the Coalition Government in its Comprehensive Spending Review has to be congratulated on sticking 
to its commitment to increase Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) levels to 
0.7 per cent of Gross National Income 
(GNI) by 2013 and enshrine it in law. 
Under the previous Labour Government 
but now under the Coalition Government 
the UK is one of very few countries 
outside the Nordic group of countries 
who are sticking to pledges on ODA made 
at the G8 in Gleneagles in 2000. In the 
UK, in the Department for International 
Development (DfID) business plan for 
2011-2015 published on November 8th 
2010, the vision behind this commitment 
is expressed as a determination ‘to help 
reduce the inequality of opportunity we 
see around the world today. We believe 
that promoting global prosperity is both 
about a moral duty and in our national 
interest’ (DfID, 2010a). It has to be noted 
however that for 2010-2011, 2011-2012 
and 2012-2013 the spending only stays 
at the same level of  GNI as now (0.56 
per cent) leaping to 0.7 per cent in 2013-
2014. This means a leap from £8.8 billion 
in 2012-2013 to £11.3 billion in 2013-
2014! The Department’s Administration 
budget will however be cut by 33 per cent 
over the period raising concerns about the 
ability of the department to deliver the 
increased aid effectively. 
These funds could however be raised in 
other ways to avoid the concerns of some 
that money that could have been spent on 
UK social provision is being spent abroad. 
The proposed financial transaction tax on 
currency and other trading, now known as 
the Robin Hood tax, if levied even at a low 
rate would generate even greater funds 
to spend on international development. 
Moves to introduce such a tax have now 
reached the agenda of the G20 with 
even the IMF subscribing to its technical 
feasibility. It is possible that President 
Sarkozy will try to push for its introduction 
when the French chair the next G20 in 
2011. The UK Government position at that 
overseas aid
BoB deacon, universiTy oF sheFField
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DfID and the Multilateral Organisations 
Performance Assessment Network 
(MOPAN) will judge these agencies but a 
concern is that some UN agencies (whose 
perceived ineffectiveness is already a 
result of under-funding) may have their 
funding reduced in favour of Multilateral 
banking agencies such as the World Bank.
In a similar vein the UK’s own aid projects 
are to be evaluated on a value for money 
basis by a new independent commission. 
This is to be chaired by the former 
President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, Graham Ward (DfID, 2010e). 
The Commission will review 20 projects a 
year and report to Parliament and publish 
its findings on its own web site.
The future of ODA is a mixed bag then. 
Certainly more money spent overseas 
with some desirable initiatives but the 
ideological context of private sector, cost 
effectiveness and international security 
within which it is to be spent raises some 
causes for concern. The job of facilitating 
international development and providing 
health, education and social protection 
services to the world’s poor would be made 
a whole lot easier if only the world would 
start taxing global financial activities, 
currency trading and bank profiteering!
led growth needs to be accompanied by 
redistributive and public sector investment 
measures, have been forgotten or perhaps 
not even read by the new Ministerial team 
(see UN HDR, 2010). 
Also of concern is the shifting of priorities 
towards international security issues. In 
line with the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review, spending to support fragile states 
and conflict affected states will increase 
from 22 per cent to 30 per cent of ODA by 
2014-2015. However the concern of some 
that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
or the Ministry of Defence might have been 
given some of these ODA funds to spend 
directly has not been realised.
VALUE FOR MONEY
In keeping with the Coalition’s spirit 
of ensuring value for money and cost 
effectiveness there are a number of DfID 
plans and activities which might have 
implications for what and how UK aid is 
delivered. The Multilateral Aid Review is 
underway and due to report in early 2011. 
It is designed to ensure that DfID supports 
only those multilateral organisations that 
deliver value for money. Organisations that 
fail to meet these criteria will have their 
money stopped. It remains to be seen how 
there was no other way. Scotland has yet 
to recover from that experiment and here 
we are again – another Tory government 
conducting an ideological experiment that 
will wreck havoc on the communities of 
Scotland.’
Scottish National Party (SNP) speakers 
also spoke of the impact of UK Government 
spending cuts on ‘Scotland’. Harvie’s 
comments here could of course be taken 
to apply to other parts of the UK which will 
also be badly affected by UK Government 
policy. Yet it is not difficult to see also here 
20,000 people marched in Edinburgh on October 23, 2010 protesting against the UK Government’s spending 
cuts. Drawn from across Scotland, those 
participating in this Scottish Trades Union 
Congress organised event listened to Green 
MSP (Member of the Scottish Parliament) 
Patrick Harvie announcing that:
‘Just over 30 years ago Margaret Thatcher 
embarked on an economic experiment 
that destroyed a large part of the Scottish 
economy and tore the heart out of many of 
our communities. We were told then that 
scoTland, The csr and puBlic secTor cuTs
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an anti-Scottish UK Government is popular 
political rhetoric and plays well across 
sizeable sections of Scottish society. The 
realities are somewhat different. Scotland 
remains a relatively wealthy country, 
but with high levels of poverty and an 
income gap between rich and poor that 
has grown steadily since devolution was 
introduced in 1999. Life expectancy in 
parts of Glasgow is repeatedly shown to be 
the lowest in Western Europe; low wages, 
unemployment and insecure employment 
are the scourge of many areas across the 
country. 
As in other areas of the UK, it is all too 
evident where the cuts are going to 
fall and in Scotland, as in London, that 
doesn’t mean fall on the bankers, financial 
institutions and other institutions of 
wealth and privilege. Scotland’s public 
sector workforce is in the front line of the 
impending cuts. There are over 500,000 
public sector workers in Scotland (and 
another 104,000 in reserved public sector 
departments such as the civil service), just 
over a quarter of the entire workforce – 
a higher proportion than in England. In 
some areas, for instance Dundee and parts 
of West Central Scotland, the proportion of 
public sector workers is considerably higher 
and there are many areas where the local 
authority, education sector or NHS are the 
largest single employers.  
What makes the Scottish situation more 
complex is that most of the public services 
that are targeted for cuts are under the 
direct control of the Scottish Government. 
The main social policy making areas 
are devolved matters. It is the Scottish 
Government that will have to implement 
cuts, make the decisions where cuts will 
fall and which has already imposed a 
pay freeze for public sector workers. The 
Scottish budget comes entirely from the 
UK parliament. Chancellor George Osborne 
has already announced that the £30 billion 
Scottish budget will be cut by around £1 
billion per year in real terms for 4 years. By 
2015 the expectation is that the Scottish 
budget will be back at the level of 2005 
and over 100,000 job losses have been 
predicted by this time also.
On November 17 2010, Scottish Finance 
Minster John Swinney presented the 
Scottish Budget to Parliament. The key 
the suggestion that in some way the UK 
Government has no remit in Scotland, no 
popular or political mandate. The 2010 UK 
general election once again resulted in a 
sharply polarised political landscape that 
serves to distinguish Scotland from the 
rest of the UK. The Tories, holding on to 
their one Scottish seat, performed very 
poorly with 16 per cent of the vote. Their 
UK Coalition partners won 11 seats and 
19 per cent of the vote. The SNP gained 6 
seats and for them a disappointing 20 per 
cent of the vote – and the Labour Party 
won 41 seats and 42 per cent of votes cast.
 
SCOTLAND AND ‘FAIRNESS’
That this is significant should not be 
underestimated by those outwith Scotland. 
It reinforces a view that is widespread 
across Scotland that, as in the 1980s, the 
political composition of the UK government 
does not reflect Scottish preferences, that 
the Coalition partners were roundly rejected 
in Scotland in the May 2010 elections, 
and that workers and communities across 
Scotland are now being subjected to a wide 
ranging assault on public services and jobs 
by a government which, for some, is ‘anti-
Scottish’! That this is taking place across 
the UK does little to calm down the latent 
nationalism, which spreads well beyond the 
SNP and informs many shades of political 
opinion and public sentiment in Scotland. 
It adds a particularly ‘Scottish’ dimension 
to the already heated and developing UK-
wide debate around ‘fairness’!
It is ‘Scotland’ that is being badly hit; 
‘Scotland’ that is suffering, paying the price 
for the economic crisis, and so on. ‘Scotland 
has come together in the past against the 
decisions of a Conservative Government 
and it is time to work together again’, said 
Kenny MacAskill, SNP MSP and Minister 
in the current Scottish Government at 
the Edinburgh demonstration highlighted 
above. Of course such rhetoric ignores 
completely that the UK Government 
bailed out the main Scottish clearing 
banks, keeping them afloat (or that the 
SNP themselves were in favour of ‘light-
touch’ regulation of financial institutions, 
not least in Scotland!) – and in the 
process throws into question the economic 
case for Scottish independence. That in 
some way ‘we’ in Scotland ‘are all in this 
together’, fighting the good fight against 
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taxation.
These developments also throw up major 
questions about the future of some of the 
those key Scottish social policies around 
which Scottish devolution has been built 
including free personal care and the funding 
of further and higher education. How can 
Scotland continue to fund free personal 
care and free tuition for students while at 
the same time continuing with plans to 
abolish all prescription charges in 2011? 
The funding of Scotland’s universities in 
particular is becoming a major political 
issue, not least given the plans already 
announced by the UK Government for the 
financing of higher education in England. 
Scottish public attitudes continually show 
considerable support for public services 
and opposition to private and for-profit 
systems of delivery. But as councils feel 
the squeeze in budgets there have been 
announcements by several local authorities 
that they will contract out/privatise key 
services – leaving service users with 
poorer quality services and workers with 
poorer wages and conditions – for those 
who will still have jobs that is.
Already some key SNP policies have gone 
by the wayside as the recent economic 
crisis deepens, for instance in relation to 
school class sizes and plans to build a new 
generation of council housing. The SNP 
Government has championed itself as the 
protectors of ‘Scottish social democracy’, 
advocating and to some limited extent 
implementing the kinds of policies that 
many would see as classic ‘old Labourist’. 
At the same time though it has been 
committed to a neoliberal economic agenda 
based on promoting economic growth and 
Scotland as a competitive and lean ‘Celtic 
Lion’ economy.
POOR WILL SUFFER MOST
In addition to the devolved areas, however, 
there are the reserved areas of public 
spending – in the main welfare benefits. 
It is estimated that that the reduction in 
welfare spending in Scotland by 2014-
2015 will amount to around £1.7 billion. It 
is the poorest sections of Scottish society 
which will suffer most from the assault 
on public services, and of course from 
welfare cuts, those living in some of the 
most deprived communities to be found 
aspect of this was the announcement 
of cuts of around £1.3 billion for 2011-
12 in an overall budget of just over £28 
billion. Housing and prisons were the two 
areas most affected by this, suffering 
cuts of 195 and 22 per cent respectively 
but £200 million of cuts were announced 
for the Scottish Funding Council (which 
finances further and higher education). 
In addition a pay freeze for public sector 
workers, health spending ring-fenced and 
a freeze on council tax for two years were 
other headline measures. As might be 
expected the impact in terms of job losses 
is somewhat contested – with Scotland’s 
main public sector unions estimating that 
over 50,000 jobs might go as a result of 
these measures. Again reflecting other 
parts of the UK, it is mainly women workers 
who will most affected by these cuts, with 
women accounting for almost 44 per cent 
of the public sector workforce north of the 
border. 
On November 14 2010 the Sunday 
Herald’s editorial called for a Scottish 
budget ‘driven by social justice’ and the 
finance secretary Swinney referred to the 
measures he announced, especially the 
desire to minimise job losses and freezing 
council tax, as ‘part of a social contract’ 
with Scotland. It is very difficult to interpret 
this Scottish Budget as an exercise in social 
justice, however defined.
FISCAL AUTONOMY 
There are other major issues thrown up 
by the UK CSR and the Scottish Budget. 
After ten years of budget increases under 
devolution, the Scottish Government 
finds itself in a very different position 
today. There are growing and developing 
arguments about how Scotland should be 
financed in the immediate future. The UK 
Coalition Government is moving ahead 
with plans to give the Scottish Parliament 
more control over fiscal powers. The 
forthcoming Scotland Bill plans to increase 
the proportion of revenue raised by the 
Holyrood Parliament with a corresponding 
decrease in the level of funding from 
Westminster, a move rejected by the 
SNP as working to decrease Scottish 
Government’s overall income. ‘Fiscal 
autonomy’ is rapidly becoming a new 
political fault line in Scotland with the SNP 
demanding more control over finances and 
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system of social security, child support 
and pensions. The UK Treasury funding 
of social security lies outside the block 
expenditure and is categorised as annually 
managed expenditure. Northern Ireland 
has also benefited from what might be 
called Barnett by-pass allocations. This 
has included special allocations and access 
to the UK Reserve for the devolution of 
policing and justice and related matters 
such as such as EU Peace Monies. The St 
Andrews Agreement to restore devolution 
in 2007 had also agreed extra financial 
assistance, including £18 billion capital 
funding over ten years. 
EXISTING CUTS AND POSITION
The Northern Ireland Government 
departments have already been making 
cuts following previous efficiency drives. A 
The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) budget allocation has resulted in a total budget reduction of £4 
billion in real terms across the Spending 
Review period. As in Scotland and 
Wales, Northern Ireland’s funding comes 
mainly through the Barnett formula. The 
recurrent expenditure would reduce by 
some 8 per cent by 2014-15, less than has 
been anticipated but still challenging. The 
outcome for capital expenditure was more 
severe with reductions of some 37 per cent 
by 2014-15, similar to capital reductions in 
Scotland and Wales.
Although social security is constitutionally 
a devolved matter, it has been the practice 
to maintain parity in benefits with Great 
Britain and the devolved legislation, and 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires 
Northern Ireland to maintain a single 
a view From norThern ireland 
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independence, the SNP position of course – 
or ‘more’ devolution, the preferred position 
of the three main unionist parties.
The Scottish elections, together with those 
in Wales and Northern Ireland will provide 
the first real and substantive opportunity 
for voters, at least some of them, to show 
what they think of UK Government policies 
too. Devolved parliament elections are 
not isolated from UK wide issues. The 
SNP terms the cuts ‘London Cuts’ while 
the Scottish Labour Party attacks the SNP 
for implementing ‘Tory cuts’! As in other 
parts of the UK, in the meantime across 
Scotland anti-cuts groups have been 
established, trades unions, service user 
and campaigning groups are mobilising 
in opposition to UK Government policies. 
While the banks and financial institutions 
of Edinburgh and elsewhere, a world 
far removed from the disadvantaged 
communities of Scotland, continue to 
generate wealth for a few. ‘All in this 
together’? Hardly!
anywhere in the UK. In Glasgow over one-
third of households have no member in 
paid work and with a high proportion of the 
population dependent on social welfare, 
Glasgow’s council leader has called the 
impending cuts ‘social vandalism’.
That Scotland is ‘in this together’, both 
in terms of impacts and resistance, is a 
myth – but a potent and powerful myth 
at that, and one that it sure to be given 
considerable play in the run up to the next 
Scottish parliament elections due for May 
2011. It is expected that the elections will 
be a straight two way fight between the 
Labour Party (which has strengthened its 
position as the most popular party in the 
past year) and the SNP with the Liberal 
Democrats expected to fair badly – and 
the Tories struggling to hold on to the 
limited vote and number of seats it already 
has, thanks primarily to the system of 
proportional representation that elects the 
parliament. And the main political fault 
line is, as in 2007, likely to revolve around 
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June 2010 emergency budget resulted in 
a reduction of £128 million. Some of the 
consequences of this can be identified, 
for example, the number of civil servants 
between 2005 and 2010 has reduced by 
3,258. Treasury statistical analysis shows 
that health expenditure per head in Northern 
Ireland fell compared to the rest of the 
UK. Thus for 2009-10 the figures per head 
were Northern Ireland £1,891; Scotland 
£2,066 Wales £1,956 and England £1,896 
(HM Treasury, 2010b). The other part of 
the efficiency drive was reflected in a policy 
of creating very large or totally centralised 
quangos. Health and social care trusts are 
among the largest health related bodies in 
the UK and the proposed single Education 
and Skills Authority was described as 
the largest local education authority in 
Europe. Economic savings arising from 
such restructuring were calculated but 
issues of local responsiveness, value for 
money, service modernisation, and public 
participation were rarely considered.
PARTY DISAGREEMENT OVER NEW 
BUDGET
While the outcome of the CSR in terms 
of the recurrent budget was better than 
anticipated it has still proved difficult 
for the parties in Northern Ireland’s 
mandatory coalition to reach agreement. 
In December 2010 the Northern Ireland 
Executive published a draft budget for the 
period 2011-2015 but this did not contain 
detailed departmental spending plans 
(DFP, 2010). There has been a particular 
impasse between the two main parties - 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and 
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein’s public position has 
been that ‘Tory cuts should be opposed’. 
A number of departmental ministers, 
including those for health and education 
have not drawn up a list of cuts. The DUP 
First Minister, Mr Peter Robinson, has 
expressed the view that the cuts are going 
too far too fast and taking such an amount 
out of capital spending would be a barrier to 
economic recovery (Robinson, 2010). The 
DUP finance minister has taken the view 
that there is no alternative to accepting the 
cuts (Wilson, 2010). Impasses in decision-
making by the Northern Ireland Executive 
are not new or unusual. The Executive is 
not bound by the principle of collective 
responsibility and there is also a cross-
party veto mechanism. Consequently 
it has experienced great difficulty in 
reaching decisions on key social policy 
topics including the implementation of the 
anti-poverty strategy, a new community 
relations strategy, academic selection 
and transfer to secondary school, a new 
equality bill, a human rights bill and an 
early years strategy.
NATURE OF THE DEBATE 
The prolonged debate on the response to 
the cuts has centred around four areas. 
Firstly, the primary focus of the Programme 
for Government 2008-2011 is on growing 
the private economy and supporting new 
businesses. This approach is reflected in 
views expressed by the Finance Minister 
that investment in the economic 
infrastructure must have priority over 
investment in the social infrastructure. 
This focus can be said to misunderstand 
the nature of devolution where social policy 
makes up the main powers devolved, 
represents some 75 per cent of devolved 
expenditure and makes up the majority of 
the devolved legislative output. Economic 
policy, fiscal policy, and income tax are all 
the responsibility of the UK Government. 
This includes corporation tax around 
which there has been a major campaign 
by business bodies and some economists 
for NI to have a lower rate to increase 
competitiveness with the Republic of 
Ireland. However, such a reduction would 
lead the Treasury to reduce Northern 
Ireland’s block grant with immediate 
adverse consequences for expenditure on 
social services.
Secondly, there has been an agenda 
aimed at reducing public sector provision 
whether by outsourcing more services 
to the private sector, reducing services 
or advocating more means-testing. This 
campaign has been directed at some of 
the provisions introduced by the devolved 
administration, such as free prescriptions 
and free travel for the over sixties. Not 
all politicians are sympathetic with this 
campaign, but in general Northern Ireland 
has not introduced major policy innovations 
such as the free personal care, abolition 
of tuition fees and more comprehensive 
early years provision introduced by the 
Scottish Executive. Thirdly, there is a 
debate about new sources of income to 
boost public expenditure. This has focused 
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olds are not in employment, education or 
training (NI Assembly, 2009).This set of 
circumstances means that the Coalition 
Government’s plans to reduce the cost 
of social security by a series of measures 
to get more people into work, reducing 
entitlement to benefit and reducing benefit 
levels will have an adverse impact. The 
problem of lack of jobs and the number 
of poor quality jobs will be exacerbated by 
anticipated additional cuts in public sector 
employment.  PriceWaterhouse Coopers 
(2010) estimate that jobs losses in NI as a 
result of the Spending Review will be in the 
region of 35,000 – 6 per cent of total jobs 
in the region. The SDLP Minister for Social 
Development has stated that the price of 
responding to the CSR will be ‘up front 
benefit cuts’ and has voiced his objection 
to many of the proposals (UTV 2010).    
If the proposals in the DWP White Paper 
on Social Security (DWP, 2010b) are 
implemented in Northern Ireland, the failure 
of the Executive to agree and implement a 
childcare strategy means that parents will 
be subject to the harsher conditionality 
without the structural support in place in 
the rest of the UK. Childcare is on average 
scarcer than elsewhere in the UK. The 
Labour Government’s Extended Schools 
policy with wrap-around childcare was not 
rolled out in Northern Ireland and there 
is no strategy for extended schools. The 
recent consultative document on a new 
Early Years Strategy for Northern Ireland 
does not consider childcare (Department 
of Education, 2010). The measures in the 
latest social security changes, such as 
the reduction in the childcare element of 
Working Tax Credit from 80 per cent to 
70 per cent of costs, will impact heavily 
on families already struggling to pay for 
childcare. 
The social care system in Northern Ireland 
is already under considerable pressure. 
Much of NI’s spending on social care 
continues to be on institutional care and 
there has been a failure to develop sufficient 
capacity in the domiciliary care sector. The 
personalisation agenda, which has been 
at the core of social care developments in 
Britain for a number of years, has not been 
progressed or invested in and the social 
care sector faces being further squeezed 
as the CSR is implemented. There is now 
evidence that the availability of nursing 
on the major devolved source of income, 
local taxes, i.e. rates in Northern Ireland 
and the continuation of a partial freeze 
on domestic and non-domestic rates, 
plus the possible introduction of specific 
water charges or taxation. Fourthly, it has 
been argued that the Northern Ireland 
allocation should take into account the 
peace process and the continuing needs 
of post-conflict reconstruction. Practically 
this means the prioritisation of expenditure 
towards maintaining security, addressing 
higher levels of social need, promoting 
regeneration, taking account of the high 
dependency on the public sector, coping 
with community divisions and encouraging 
political participation and inclusion – in 
effect all the ‘glue’ that holds together the 
peace process and political settlement.
MEETING NEED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
CSR
The failure of the Executive to take decisions 
on key areas of policy and slow progress 
on others means that the context in which 
cuts will be implemented is very different in 
NI. In relation to a number of policy areas 
including early years, childcare, social care 
and poverty reduction NI lags behind the 
rest of the UK. Cuts to the welfare budget 
and radical changes to entitlement and 
conditionality have particular implications 
for the most marginalized individuals, 
who faced considerable challenges even 
when the economy was growing. The 
increasing precariousness of employment 
only adds to a range of long standing and 
well evidenced obstacles to labour market 
participation (Gray and Horgan, 2009). 
These include low pay, poor quality jobs, 
low levels of educational qualifications and 
skills among the unemployed, the lack of 
structural support such as childcare and 
public transport and high levels of disability 
and limiting long term illness. The most 
recent labour market report (DETI, 2010) 
shows that NI’s employment rate remains 
well below the UK average and is the 
lowest of the twelve UK regions. In the 
past year the Northern Ireland claimant 
count increased by nine per cent compared 
to a fall of ten per cent across the UK. Over 
45 per cent of those unemployed have 
been so for a year or more. Of the 24,000 
newly unemployed in Northern Ireland last 
year over 37 per cent were aged between 
18 and 24 and 19 per cent of 16-24 year 
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homes places is becoming increasingly 
limited as a result of funding issues (BBC 
Northern Ireland, 2010). 
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN
Decisions need to be made about what 
the core services are for the devolved 
administration and which areas are priorities 
in terms of need. There is evidence of some 
new debates emerging.  For example, 
tuition fees for higher education have been 
in line with those in England.  However, 
there appears to be a reluctance to copy 
the latest policy on tuition fees proposed 
in England, although some increase is 
likely. There are major dangers in focusing 
on costs alone without considering quality 
of provision, modernisation of services 
and delivery mechanisms. The Barnett 
Formula is a further guide to what 
action should be followed. The Barnett 
consequentials explain the details of 
planned expenditure increases in England 
which convert into the Barnett allocations. 
The reason why NI has more money than 
expected through the Barnett Formula is 
the ring-fencing of health, and increased 
expenditure on education and adult social 
care in England. Northern Ireland should 
broadly follow this guideline. Although the 
devolved administrations have discretion 
over expenditure, the Barnett Formula 
has an underlying principle that maintains 
expenditure roughly proportional between 
the four countries of the UK. More efficient 
delivery and administrative systems could 
be introduced in NI through applying the 
principles relating to ‘fit for purpose’ in 
devolved governance, with more joined 
up government at the centre, between 
devolved departments, the very large 
quango sector and local government.  
Welfare to work requires work. The 
figures above highlight the reality of the 
Northern Ireland labour market. The 
geographical concentration of economic 
inactivity and long term sickness and 
disability correlates strongly with areas 
most affected by the conflict. There is little 
prospect of measures proposed by DWP in 
the November White Paper (DWP, 2010d) 
having a positive impact. The devolved 
powers allow for divergent policy in NI and 
there is precedent for this (for example, the 
payment of childcare expenses to family 
members for lone parents on statutory 
employment programmes). The question 
is whether NI ministers are prepared to 
take such an approach. 
In practice the likely outcome in NI will 
be a negotiated position between the two 
main political parties which may identify 
a few priority areas, for example part 
of health but not social care, but also 
largely reflect a ‘salami’ slicing approach 
whereby all 12 government departments 
receive a similar cut. Ultimately, politicians 
will have to justify departure from the 
Barnett consequentials and the resulting 
implications of this. 
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banking sector to comply with both the 
letter and the spirit of the law and not 
to engage in or promote tax avoidance. 
(Inland Revenue, 2010: 30)
This is a very softly-softly approach, 
particularly when compared with the 
Government’s hard line policies towards 
those on benefit, where people who do not 
take up job offers could lose their benefits 
for up to three years.
HARD RHETORIC, SOFT POLICY
The CSR also confirmed that the 
Government would not be continuing with 
Labour’s one-off bonus tax but would, 
instead, introduce a banking levy. Few 
concrete details were provided but the CSR 
suggested that the levy would generate 
around £2.5 billion per year, rather less 
than the £3.5 billion raised by the bonus 
tax last year. Bankers’ bonuses in Britain in 
2009 were £7.3 billion and expected to also 
be about £7 billion in 2010, significantly 
lower than the £11 billion paid out at the 
height of the boom in 2007 (BBC, 2010b) 
but still a considerable sum of money going 
to a relative handful of people at a time of 
major welfare cuts. Nick Clegg, leader of 
the Liberal Democrats and Deputy Prime 
Minister said, at the Liberal Democrat 
conference in September 2010, that the 
Government would introduce a super-
tax if bankers failed to show restraint on 
bonuses (Guardian, 2010b).  
But, as with tax avoidance, the rhetoric 
may be hard but the policy content is soft.
While the CSR said relatively little about 
wealth and the wealthy, the emergency 
budget in June 2010 was a perfect 
The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) in October 2010 announced major cuts in public expenditure 
which look set to hit the poorest hardest. 
With the exception of students there 
was little immediate resistance to the 
announced cuts but a fair degree of fatalism 
about their ‘inevitability’. But there is an 
alternative. The last thirty years have been 
extremely good ones for the wealthiest in 
our society and if we are ‘all in it together’ 
then there is definitely much more scope 
to ask wealthier groups to make more of a 
contribution. Britain is one of the wealthiest 
countries in the world but this wealth is 
very unevenly distributed. The top ten per 
cent of the population received a greater 
share of total income than the whole of the 
bottom half in 2002-3 (Hills, 2004). And the 
top 10 per cent owned 100 times more in 
terms of personal wealth than the bottom 
10 per cent in 2006-8 (Hills, 2010). There 
is a particular concentration of income and 
wealth at the very top with the richest 1 
per cent of the population receiving about 
13 per cent of all income and about 23 per 
cent of all wealth (Paxton and Taylor, 2002; 
Atkinson and Salverda, 2003). Wealthy 
groups benefitted greatly from tax cuts in 
the 1980s and it is now time to ask them to 
contribute a fairer share towards a welfare 
state which they themselves benefit from, 
along with others in society.
But the CSR had relatively little to say 
about wealth and the wealthy. One of the 
rare exceptions to this was a reference 
to reducing tax avoidance in the banking 
sector: The CSR said that:
The Government will continue to monitor 
tax receipts from the banking sector. As 
part of this, the Government expects the 
all in This TogeTher? reFlecTions on wealTh, The 
wealThy and Fairness
Karen rowlingson, universiTy oF Birmingham
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opportunity to ensure that different groups 
paid their fair share of taxes to maintain 
services. Once again, there was some 
strong rhetoric employed here.  Even 
George Osborne, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, pointed out that: ‘Some of the 
richest people in this country have been 
able to pay less tax than the people who 
clean for them’ (Belfast Telegraph, 2010). 
He claimed that they had managed this 
partly through turning some of their income 
into capital and paying less tax as a result. 
His solution to this was to increase Capital 
Gains Tax, currently 18 per cent to 28 per 
cent for higher earners. Low and middle-
income savers would continue to pay 18 
per cent. But this is a very small change: 
Capital Gains Tax could have been increased 
to the same rate as income tax for all. 
By having a lower rate, the Government 
is still effectively giving tax breaks to the 
wealthy who can transfer income into 
capital. George Osborne did admit that the 
Government had considered introducing 
further tapers or indexation allowances to 
Capital Gains Tax instead of the flat rates, 
but had concluded that the complexity and 
administration involved would have been 
‘self-defeating’. Such excuses rarely deter 
governments from making changes to the 
benefit system.
The Government also backed away from 
a confrontation with wealthy non-doms 
who avoid paying tax on their overseas 
income. (Non-doms are people who have 
“non-domiciled” status. They are often 
from abroad or spend time abroad but live 
and work in the UK. They pay tax on UK 
earnings but not on any money generated 
abroad, provided they do not spend it in 
the UK.) There had been some expectation 
that the Government would introduce 
measures to clamp down on this group 
but, instead, the Government is merely 
to launch a review of the taxation of non-
domiciled individuals. It is also considering 
a controversial general anti-avoidance rule 
(GAAR), abandoned by Labour in 1999 as 
unworkable (Guardian, 2010a). So, once 
again, firm, concrete action is lacking.
Just prior to the CSR, the Government 
announced some changes to Alistair 
Darling’s previous proposals on non-state 
pension tax relief. This form of tax relief is a 
‘hidden’ form of welfare which goes largely 
to those on higher incomes (Sinfield, 2007) 
and costs the public purse about £20 
billion in 2009/10 (HMRC, 2010). This is a 
considerable sum which would have been 
enough in 2007/8 to cover the entire cost 
of Pension Credit, winter fuel payments 
and free TV licences for the over 75s, still 
leaving enough left over to cover most of 
the cost of Income Support for working 
age adults. The Government’s proposals 
on non-state pension tax relief are fairly 
modest, restricting the annual amount of 
tax-free income from £255,000 to £50,000 
that savers can put into pensions (BBC, 
2010c). The Treasury expects that this 
will largely affect those on income over 
£100,000 and hopes that the changes will 
eventually save it more than £4 billion a 
year. But it could have gone much further 
and either abolished non-state pension 
tax relief altogether or reduced it to the 
standard rate for all workers.  
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
At a time of major cuts to basic benefits 
and services, the Government could do 
much more in relation to Capital Gains 
Tax, tax avoidance, taxation of non-doms 
and non-state pension tax relief. And it 
could also consider a range of alternative 
policies. For example, the Nobel award-
winning economist Sir James Mirrlees 
(Mirrlees et al., 2010) recently reviewed 
the tax system and proposed the following 
reforms to wealth taxes:
•   Replacing council tax and stamp 
duty with a more progressive tax 
proportional to the current value of 
domestic property.
•   Replacing inheritance tax with a more 
progressive and comprehensive 
lifetime wealth transfer tax
These are radical proposals coming from 
a highly eminent economist and should be 
taken seriously by the Government.
Alongside changes to the tax system, 
the Government should also find ways of 
curbing excessive pay at the top. David 
Cameron set up the Hutton Review of Fair 
Pay in the Public Sector (HM Treasury, 
2010c) to consider whether there should 
be a ratio of 20:1 for pay in the public 
sector, though the pay gap is even greater 
in the private sector and should also be 
considered there. The ratio of 20:1 is 
actually much greater than the general 
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Government is currently taking a very 
‘softly-softly’ approach towards this group 
while at the same time taking a hard 
line against people on benefits. We need 
policies that will produce a fairer system 
from the start, in terms of wages policy, 
and then a tax policy which ensures that 
those who can afford to do so, contribute 
more.
public consider appropriate. In various 
waves of the British Social Attitudes 
Surveys, the public consistently support a 
ratio of 6:1 (Heath, 2010 forthcoming).
The wealthy have benefitted greatly from 
tax cuts and other economic changes since 
the 1980s. It is time for them to make a 
fairer contribution to the public purse. The 
financial sector crisis into a national public 
spending one. The discourses involved in 
achieving this amazing act of blame shifting 
are almost identical to those employed by 
the first Thatcher Government in the early 
1980s and reflect perennial neo-liberal 
formulations. Back then, when facing a 
budget deficit, it was asserted, first, that 
‘there is no alternative’ to public expenditure 
cuts because ‘public expenditure is at the 
heart of Britain’s economic difficulties’ (HM 
Treasury, 1979:1). The current version has 
hardly been updated: deep and immediate 
cuts in public expenditure are unavoidable.
The attack on public expenditure by 
the Thatcher Government was justified 
on the spurious economic grounds that 
investment in the public sector ‘crowds out’ 
investment in the private sector. This thesis 
gained currency in the mid-1970s (Bacon 
and Eltis, 1976) but was exposed as being 
merely a revamped version of the familiar 
public burden of welfare idea which had 
no scientific basis (Walker, Ormerod and 
Whitty, 1977; Walker, 1982). Nonetheless 
it was seized upon by the Thatcher 
Government because it appeared to 
provide academic legitimacy for ideological 
conviction and it became an often quoted 
part of the conventional wisdom in favour of 
spending cuts. The then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe’s first budget 
speech contains remarkable parallels with 
There have been reductions in public expenditure previously, for example under the Labour Governments of 
the 1970s and Conservative ones of the 
1980s, which were also accompanied by 
colourful anti-state rhetoric. However, they 
pale in comparison with the present Con-
Dem Coalition Government’s proposals 
contained in the Comprehensive Spending 
Review (CSR). These cuts, if achieved, 
presage the largest sustained and deepest 
retrenchment in public spending since the 
1920s. Their scale and potential negative 
impact demands a concerted response 
from the social policy community, one 
which extends beyond scientific analysis 
to open campaigning. This will not be to 
everyone’s taste, after all social policy is 
a very broad, hybrid, multidisciplinary 
mix but, at the very least, there should 
be an informed national debate about our 
response to the present unprecedented 
attacks on the welfare state. Here we set 
out some ideas about the key points on 
which this debate might be focused and 
outline a possible oppositional strategy for 
social policy.
THE DEFICIT
The essential starting point for an alternative 
policy to the cuts must be the public sector 
deficit and, in particular, the astonishing 
political transformation of a global private 
From The poliTics and policy oF The cuTs To an 
ouTline oF an opposiTional sTraTegy
alan walKer, universiTy oF sheFField and carol walKer, 
universiTy oF lincoln
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terms: gross government debt averages 
115 per cent in the G7 countries, including 
80 per cent in France and Germany, 90 
per cent in the US and 230 per cent in 
Japan (Cottonelli and Schaechter, 2010). 
The Office of Budget Responsibility (2010) 
notes that the measures proposed in the 
Labour Government’s March 2010 Budget 
would have halved the deficit in 4 years. 
In response to the assertion that there 
is no alternative, there are in fact many; 
such as a 50 per cent tax rate on incomes 
over £100,000 (which would raise £4.7 
billion per annum), closing tax loopholes 
(£25 billion), a tax on vacant housing (£5 
billion) and a Tobin (Robin Hood) Tax (£20 
billion) (Dolphin, 2010). 
Secondly, a sustained focus must be on the 
social consequences of the Government’s 
deficit reduction strategy and, in particular, 
their distributional impact on poverty and 
inequality. This is the route by which 
the assertion of ‘fairness’ can be cross-
examined. The first detailed assessment 
of the Coalition’s policies by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS), following the 
emergency budget in June 2010, revealed 
the regressive outcome: the poorest 10 
per cent of households will lose 5 per cent 
of their income as a result of the proposed 
changes between 2010 and 2014, while 
the top 10 per cent will lose less than 1 
per cent (Brown and Levell, 2010b). The 
IFS reached the same negative conclusion 
on the CSR: by 2012/13 the impact on 
the net incomes of the poorest decile in 
the income distribution will be ten times 
greater than on the richest one and, overall 
by 2014/5, the impact on the former will 
be three times greater than on the latter 
(O’Dea, 2010). Treasury analysis of the 
CSR suggests progressivity, but omitted 
reforms likely to fall most heavily on the 
poor, such as those to Housing Benefit, 
Employment Support Allowance, Disability 
Living Allowance and Council Tax Benefit. 
In contrast to the heaviest burden of the 
deficit reduction strategy being imposed 
on the poorest people, the total pay 
awarded to the top executives in the FTSE 
100 companies rose by 55 per cent in the 
year to June 2010, a period in which the 
FTSE 100 gained less than 20 points (IDS, 
2010). In the last decade these companies 
lost 19 per cent of their value but their chief 
executives’ pay increased by 160 per cent 
on average. The financial crisis originated 
the current Coalition Government’s deficit 
discourse. For example, the third of his 
four key principles was ‘the reduction in 
the borrowing requirement of the public 
sector (‘the deficit’ as we know it today) 
which leaves room for the rest of the 
economy to prosper’ (Hansard, vol 968, 
12 June 1979: 240). Today we are told, 
with equal certainty, that cuts in the public 
sector will be compensated for by growth 
in the private sector, although the passage 
of time seems to have removed the need 
for any scientific evidence to support this 
claim. Another striking parallel is that the 
Conservative Government’s cuts discourse 
30 years ago was accompanied by an 
appeal to ‘Victorian values’ such as self-
help and community support. Fast forward 
and now we have the ‘Big Society’ which, 
while it acknowledges that there is such a 
thing as society, appears to have the same 
anti-state underpinnings.
In response to the Coalition Government’s 
ideological assertions it is important to 
endeavour to recast the politics of the 
deficit in a more enlightened direction. This 
is because, on the one hand, the public 
sector is a crucial source of welfare and 
social justice.  Of course it is much more 
than that, including a source of injustice, 
but this is not a simplistic defensive strategy 
that we are proposing. On the other hand 
the social costs of the deficit reduction 
strategy will not be shared evenly but are 
set to fall hardest on those most reliant on 
social security and public services (Brown 
and Levell, 2010b).
There are three potentially fruitful avenues 
down which we may seek a recasting of 
the politics of the deficit. First of all, as in 
the early 1980s, it is important to closely 
scrutinize the evidence assembled for the 
scale and speed of the actions being taken 
to reduce the deficit. This will demonstrate 
that the main engine is an ideological 
necessity rather than an economic one. 
For example, we might question the 
apparently widely accepted but erroneous 
official assessment about the extent and 
significance of the deficit. Quite simply the 
public debt threat has been blown out of 
proportion: it is large but not in historical 
terms (250 per cent of GDP after the 
Second World War, never below 100 per 
cent from 1920 to 1960, and 70 per cent 
now). Nor is it excessive in comparative 
56 In Defence of Welfare: The Impacts of the Spending Review
Towards an Alternative
in the banking sector and it should be 
subjected to particularly close scrutiny. 
So far the heady pre-election rhetoric 
about squeezing bankers’ bonuses has not 
resulted in any significant action. In fact, in 
the repeat of history as tragedy, it appears 
that it is the same groups of people who 
lose the most: poor working families with 
children and those dependent on social 
security benefits. In other words it is those 
same families who are losing Educational 
Maintenance Allowance, Housing and 
Council Tax Benefit, Working Tax Credit, 
Childcare Tax Credits and others.  The 
slight increase in Child Tax Credit of less 
than £3 per week is but a fraction of these 
multiple losses.
The third focus of attention should be the 
deficit discourse itself. As in previous eras 
of strong neo-liberal political ascendancy, 
the present discourse is designed to 
perform the important political functions 
of both legitimisation and diversion from 
fundamental questions of causation and 
just desserts in financing the deficit. 
Thus, when attention is focused on the 
deficit as the main problem, there is less 
opportunity to question the role of the 
financial institutions in causing the global 
debt crisis and the need for radical reform 
of the international finance system. For 
example, the influence of the credit rating 
agencies, given the role by politicians of 
arbiters of Britain’s economic strategy, 
must be questioned. Rather than subjecting 
the banks’ sub-prime mortgages to close 
scrutiny, or due diligence, in the lead up to 
the financial collapse, they awarded them 
their highest rating – triple A. A pertinent 
question is why these private sector 
organizations, which are deeply implicated 
in the debt crisis, are suitable to assess this 
or any other country’s credit worthiness. 
Similar questions should be directed at the 
deficit rhetoric. For example, the assertion 
that public investment will be replaced by 
private investment (crowding back in) does 
not bear scrutiny. The National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
(Barrell, 2010) concludes that government 
spending cuts will reduce potential growth 
every year from 2011 to 2015. The real 
driving force is a reprise of the Thatcher 
dogma that the public sector is too large. As 
the Treasury minister put it when winding 
up the debate on the 2010 Finance Bill, ‘we 
cannot afford a public sector of the size to 
which it has grown’. For the record, public 
expenditure is currently 45 per cent of GDP 
compared with 44 per cent in Germany, 53 
per cent in France, 52 per cent in Sweden 
and an OECD average of 40 per cent.  
ELEMENTS OF AN OPPOSITIONAL 
STRATEGY
What contribution should the social policy 
community be making to the case against 
the scale, speed and distribution of the 
present deficit reduction policies? Because 
of our discipline’s close proximity to the 
welfare state and to the distributional 
consequences of social policy it is natural 
that it will want to play a leading role. What 
form might it take? In terms of content 
there are three critical elements.
•   As outlined above, it is essential to 
conduct a sustained case against 
the present socially unjust deficit 
reduction strategy based on both its 
false claims and its negative impact 
on poverty and inequality.  While 
necessary, and bread and butter to 
social policy analysts, this defensive 
stance must be combined with the 
framing of progressive alternatives
•   A useful starting point is the universal 
subordination of social policy to 
economic policy and critiques of its 
particularly sharp national and global 
variants under neo-liberalism. This 
could form the basis for a more radical 
approach to social policy which removes 
it from its subordinate role (the poor 
person’s economic policy) to a more 
central position. There have been 
various attempts to achieve this, one 
of the most promising of which is the 
social quality initiative which subsumes 
the economic within the social and 
sets practical yardsticks by which to 
measure the progress of society and, 
therefore, the effects of both economic 
and social policy (Beck, et al., 2001). 
In similar vein it is important to keep 
alive the alternative discourse on the 
purposes of growth, which had just got 
under way in the wake of the global 
debt crisis and was swamped by the 
deficit reduction rhetoric (Stiglitz, Sen 
and Fitoussi, 2009).
•   The third critical element is advancing 
the case for social justice. The 
link between the Prime Minister’s 
‘happiness’ agenda and the correlation 
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sciences and, therefore, will need to make 
common cause in this together with other 
cognate disciplines. This will be required 
also to argue against the present threat to 
the social sciences and arts and humanities 
posed by changes to tuition fees.
A broad, concerted effort is what is 
required to influence the public debate on 
the future of the welfare state. Publications 
such as this are necessary certainly, as 
well as national debates, blogs and so on. 
But also necessary are small scale teach-
ins and debates in universities, colleges, 
schools and town halls, on topics such 
as the importance of universalism, the 
unequal impact of the CSR and alternative 
approaches to deficit reduction. If there 
was ever a time for the social policy 
community to lead a national campaign in 
defence of welfare and for social justice, 
that time is now.
between equality and well-being 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) is an 
obvious way into this argument. The 
paucity of the political debate following 
the Coalition Government’s breach 
of the universal foundations of Child 
Benefit is a signal of our collective 
failure to inform the public about this 
central principle of the welfare state, 
although the politicians must bear 
the main responsibility. It is obvious 
that the case for universalism has 
to be re-stated for new generations. 
Similarly with the need for a fair and 
progressive tax system. These are the 
twin essentials for social justice both 
nationally and globally.
The social policy community is the best 
placed of all academic disciplines to 
advance these defensive and progressive 
arguments. But it is also part of the social 
Based on our conclusion to ‘Fighting Poverty, Inequality and Social Injustice’ 
(edited with Adrian Sinfield), Policy Press, 2011
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